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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of a final summary judgment, a ruling in regard to a motion in 
limine, a cross appeal in regard to setting aside a portion of a judgment by a successor 
judge, and replacing such judgment with one of his own, and a ruling in regard to a case 
closely related that was transferred from Davis County. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to UCA Section 78-2a-3(2)Q), Section 78-2-2(3)0) and Section 78-2a3(3). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The lower Court did not err in holding that a party cannot, as a matter of 
law, establish possession of the property in support of an adverse possession claim, if he 
leases the property to a tenant. This issue was preserved at R. 6549-6564. "Summary 
judgment is only appropriate when 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and...the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' Thus, summary 
judgment involves only legal conclusions, which we review for correctness, according no 
deference to the trial court." Martin v. Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
2. The lower Court did not err in refusing to grant summary judgment in favor 
of David and Inez Allred on their adverse possession claim. This issue was preserved at 
R. 4307-4332 and R. 6549-6564. Like the first issue, this issue is reviewed for 
correctness under the summary judgment standard Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 50 
(Utah 1996). 
3. The lower Court did not err in concluding that David and Inez Allred's 
causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive trust, declaratory 
judgment, and punitive damages are barred by the statute of limitations and that equitable 
estoppel and the "special circumstances exception" did not bar the Allred Trusts' statute 
of limitations defense. This issue was preserved below at R. 5402-5471, and is reviewed 
for correctness. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-14. Possession of tenant deemed 
possession of landlord. 
When the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any persons, 
the possession of the tenant is deemed the possession of the landlord until 
the expiration of seven years from the termination of the tenancy, or, where 
there has been no written lease, until the expiration of seven years from the 
time of the last payment of rent, notwithstanding that such tenant may have 
acquired another title, or may have claimed to hold adversely to his 
landlord; but such presumption cannot be made after the periods herein 
limited. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-25. Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years; 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument 
in writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and 
for any article charged on a store account; also on an open account for 
work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that 
action in all of the foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within 
four years after the last charge is made or the last payment is received; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of 
Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent (a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which 
in specific situations limits the time for action to one year, under Section 
25-6-19; (b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or [c] Subsection 25-6-6(1) 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-26. Within three years. 
An action may be brought within three years:... 
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of 
action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved 
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake; 
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-7. Adverse possession -
Possession presumed in owner. 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, 
the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to 
have been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the 
occupation of the property by any other person shall be deemed to have 
been under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the 
property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven 
years before the commencement of the action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/Appellants are appealing from a summary judgment entered by the 
Fourth District Court of Utah County, Utah, dismissing Plaintiffs' claims for breach of 
fiduciary duty, fraud, constructive trust, punitive damages and declaratory judgment. 
Plaintiffs' claim for adverse possession was precluded due to a ruling by the court on a 
motion in limine precluding Plaintiffs from asserting that they had established adverse 
possession through their tenant. As a matter of law, the tenant became the tenant of the 
Trusts at the time the quitclaim deeds were executed in 1982 and 1983. 
While Plaintiffs attempt to spin a compelling story, the facts, evidence, documents 
and their witnesses do not support their claims. A brief statement of salient facts follows: 
In 1974, David and Inez Allred, Plaintiffs, leased a piece of property known as the 
"Provo property" to the telephone company in Provo, Utah. R. 2660-2662, 5367-5370. 
In 1982, David Allred created nine irrevocable trusts for the benefit of his two sons 
and their families and transferred the "Provo property" to those nine Allred Trusts. The 
two quitclaim deeds used to transfer the "Provo property" were executed, notarized and 
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recorded with the Utah County Recorder in December 1982 and February 1983. Add. B 
In 1991, David Allred decided he wanted to give the same "Provo property" to the 
L.D.S. Church. He approached the trustee of the nine Allred Trusts and asked that the 
trustee sign the "Provo property" back. When the trustee explained that he could not 
legally do so, David Allred began a demanding campaign to force the trustee, Richard 
Allred, to sign the Provo property back to him. 
David Allred even used deceit in claiming that he did not know that he did not own 
the Provo property. The testimony of his personal attorney and the L.D.S. Foundation 
representative would fully contradict David's story. David's own letters and meetings 
with his attorney and the L.D.S. Foundation in 1991-1993 would contradict further his 
ever changing story regarding the Provo property. Even now, Plaintiffs' Supreme Court 
Brief, page 7, contains the unique new admission that perhaps David and Inez "had 
forgotten about the deeds..." 
Any allegation of wrongdoing on the part of trustee, Richard Allred, is quickly 
dispelled when one examines the complete lack of evidence presented by Plaintiffs. No 
evidence has been presented. No testamentary and no documentary evidence of 
wrongdoing has been submitted to the Court. And, the Court has never ruled or indicated 
that any wrongdoing occurred. 
Additionally, when one compares the actual trust documents created by David 
Allred in 1982, one finds that they are the very same identical trust documents [word for 
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word, section for section] which David Allred used four years earlier in 1978 when he 
created a trust for his daughter and her family wherein he conveyed a parcel of land to 
them. R. 2677-2689. Addendum C. 
Plaintiffs have, through a series of lies, misrepresentations, untrue allegations, 
false accusations and innuendo, tried to create a story of betrayal by a son to his parents. 
The untrue story was told, but no evidence was ever presented to substantiate it. 
And then, as a back up argument in case no one believed their story, Plaintiffs in 
2001, made their unsubstantiated claim of adverse possession against the Provo property. 
No evidence, no documents, no prior mention of adverse possession or of any open, 
hostile or notorious claim of ownership or any claim of actual or beneficial ownership, or 
right to the proceeds of the rents was every mentioned prior to the filing of this lawsuit. 
Rather, the only mention of the Provo property after 1991, were requests from Plaintiffs 
asking the trustee to transfer title back to them. 
Plaintiffs' case was filed in Utah County Fourth Judicial District Court. The trier 
of fact heard the various allegations and arguments and saw and heard the evidence 
presented by both sides. Two different judges were assigned to sit on this case during the 
five year period it was before the Court. Rulings were made by both judges, and both 
judges ruled that the "Provo property is owned by the trusts and the lease rents should be 
paid to the trusts." R. 1207 Plaintiffs' Addendums A, B, and C. It is from those rulings 
Plaintiffs now bring this appeal. They present no new evidence to prove their case, and 
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no new law, but rather, after six years of litigation, now offer the words, "It was 
understandable that David and Inez had forgotten about the deeds.,.". Plaintiffs' 
Supreme Court Brief, page 7. 
It should be noted that David Allred passed away at the age of 93 years in 
December 2001, just ten months after this case was filed. He had been diagnosed with 
age related dementia and was declared to be incompetent prior to the filing of this action. 
Mr. Alfred's deposition was noticed for early July 2001, however, Plaintiffs' counsel 
made a motion for a protective order based on Mr. AUred's mental incompetence. 
Inez Allred, the only Plaintiff to testify, gave extremely conflicting testimony in 
her various depositions, affidavits and erratas. She passed away December 2006. 
Mary Allred Jensen, a daughter, was substituted in as a Plaintiff representing 
David Alfred's estate. She is the successor trustee to David and Inez Alfred's personal 
wills and trusts and is the sole beneficiary thereof. Mary Allred Jensen appears to be the 
driving force behind this litigation and is the only individual who stands to benefit 
therefrom. There are four Allred children. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs argue that they have established adverse possession through the 
possession of a tenant. Utah law requires that in order to substantiate adverse possession, 
there must be occupancy of the property for seven years. During that time, the occupant, 
i.e. the adverse possessor, must pay the taxes and perform various other exercises 
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demonstrating open, hostile and notorious occupancy of the land. 
In this instance, according to Pender v. Jackson, 260 P.2d 542 (Utah 1953), it 
requires actual occupancy, and not that of a tenant. Although some cases in the past 
allowed tenants to hold for their landlords, it was always a situation where a tenant was 
put upon the property at the onset of the adverse possession period, and not that of a 
preexisting tenant. 
The fatal blow to Plaintiffs' argument is that Qwest, or the telephone company, 
was not their tenant. The contract with the telephone company for the lease of the 
property was a covenant running with the land, and survived a sale or transfer of the 
property, and, was enforceable by both the tenant and the landlord. Following the 
execution of the quitclaim deeds, the owner, which was the Trusts, became the landlord 
and the telephone company continued to be the tenant. 
Thus, you can argue about the possession of the tenant being the possession of the 
landlord. But following the transfer of the property by the quitclaim deeds, the Trusts as 
the new owner, became the landlord, as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs' use of the statute, UCA 78-12-14, was misleading. The purpose of the 
statute was not to create rights in a putative landlord, as the Plaintiffs claimed, but was to 
prevent the landlord/owner from the adverse claims of the tenant. Plaintiffs could not be 
the landlord, since they extinguished their position as landlord with the signing and 
execution of the quitclaim deeds. Plaintiffs could not be the tenant, either, since that 
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position was held by the telephone company who was the tenant of the Trusts, the legal 
owner and landlord, pursuant to law. Therefore, this statute has been misused since it 
does not in any way serve to enhance the Plaintiffs' position. In fact, it actually enhances 
the position of the true owner, title holder, and landlord of the property, i.e. the Trusts. 
Since Plaintiffs claim to have paid all of the taxes on the property through their 
"tenant", their claim for adverse possession must fail, as well. Because Plaintiffs were 
not the tenant, hot the landlord, and had no interest in the property, their claim as to 
paying the taxes on the property must fail. The taxes were paid by the tenant, pursuant to 
a contract entered into in 1974, wherein the tenant was required to pay the taxes either 
directly or to reimburse the landlord or anyone else who might pay the taxes. 
Thus, just as possession of the property through a tenant is not viable, payment of 
the taxes upon the property, by a tenant, which is not their tenant, but the tenant of the 
Trusts, is not viable, as well. 
As to tolling the statute of limitations, it becomes abundantly clear that David 
Allred knew late in 1991 he had signed the quitclaim deeds, executed the trusts, and 
transferred the property. As a matter of fact, David Allred knew that in 1982, and 
Plaintiffs even acknowledge on page 7 of their Brief, where they state: "...It was 
understandable that David and Inez had forgotten about the deeds..." The statute of 
limitations is not tolled because one forgets knowledge which he previously held. In any 
event, both the letters R. 2545-2548 of David Allred and the judicial decision of January 
8 
23, 2004, identify David Alfred's knowledge as to the veracity of the quitclaim deeds, the 
establishment of the Trusts, and as declarations against interest, are incorporated in Judge 
Stott's decision of January 23, 2004, wherein he rendered summary judgment based on 
the statute of limitations in favor of the Defendant Trusts. R. 8175, p. 108-109. 
Addendum B, Plaintiffs' Addendum B. 
Both judges who heard this case ruled that the Trusts own the Provo property and 
have for a long time, and as such, they are entitled to the rent proceeds therefrom. Judge 
Schofield ruled on the basis of the documents which had been presented to him on 
October 2, 2001, without any reference to the statute of limitations, and/or any mention of 
any potential fraud or wrongdoing. 
In addition, Judge Stott, absent any discussion of fraud or wrongdoing, ruled that 
the statute of limitations had long since run, since David Alfred had known of the 
execution of the quitclaim deeds and had also threatened legal action as he was 
represented by an attorney from 1991 forward. There can be no question that David 
Alfred was aware of his rights to litigate and decided not to take any action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT UTAH 
LAW DOES NOT ALLOW ADVERSE POSSESSION THROUGH A 
TENANT, AND IN THIS CASE, THE TENANT WAS THE TENANT 
OF THE ALLRED TRUSTS AFTER THE DEEDS WERE 
EXECUTED IN 1982 AND 1983. 
There is no authority in the State of Utah for the concept Appellants are trying to 
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persuade the Court to adopt. Appellants/Plaintiffs are urging the Court to support the 
proposition that Qwest was Plaintiffs' tenant and that Plaintiffs' were Qwest's landlord in 
their claim of adverse possession. The fact is, when the property was transferred to the 
Allred Trusts in 1982-1983, Qwest, at that time, became the tenant of the Trusts. 
Plaintiffs were no longer the landlord, and, as a matter of law, Qwest became the tenant 
of the Allred Trusts. R. 2660, 2662. Addendum B. 
"When title passes, lessee ceases to hold under the grantor and he becomes 
a tenant of the grantee. Privity is automatically established between lessor's 
grantee and the lessee." Murphrey v. Wins low, 318 S.E. 2d 849 
(North Carolina 1984). See also: 327 S.E. 2d 878 (1985) 
In accord, Pearce v. Gay, 139 S.E. 2d 567 (1965), Blankenau v. Landess, 626 
N.W. 2d 588 (Nebraska 2001), Kirk Corp. v. First American Title Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 
785, 270 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1990). It is little wonder, then, that based on the abovementioned 
law and the documents provided, the Court, in 2001, determined: 
...The documents provided by Richard Allred demonstrate that the property 
leased by QWEST is owned by the trusts, David and Inez Allred having 
conveyed it to the trusts in 1982. Though plaintiffs assert that they have a 
colorable claim to the lease rents, I don't see it. Rather, on the face of the 
documents provided by the parties, the property is owned by the trusts 
and the lease rents should be paid to the trusts, (Emphasis added) R. 1207 
Plaintiffs, from the date of the Court ruling, October 2, 2001, had nearly three 
years to discover, process, and submit further documents supporting their Complaint and 
causes of action prior to the trial date of July 26, 2004. During that time, Plaintiffs 
submitted no additional documents in support of their claim which would persuade the 
10 
Court to change or alter its' ruling. Plaintiffs' Addendum A 
Even as late as October 18, 2005, Judge Schofield signed an Order from the July 
26, 2004 hearing which stated in Number 5: "...There has been no intervening change 
in controlling authority since October 2, 2001. No new evidence on this issue has 
arisen since the October 2, 2001 Ruling. " R. 8082. Plaintiffs' Addendum C. 
Plaintiffs assert error on the part of the Court, but have provided no evidence and no new 
evidence . Where is the evidence that would persuade a Court to rule otherwise? 
II. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS' RULINGS SINCE 
PLAINTIFFS COULD NOT AND DID NOT PRODUCE 
DOCUMENTS, RECORDS OR ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIMS AND MEET THEIR 
BURDEN OF PROOF. 
Thus, it was understandable that Judge Stott, the trier of fact, ratified and adopted 
the 2001 ruling by Judge Schofield and then granted summary judgment in February 2004 
in favor of the Allred Trusts, on all causes of action except adverse possession. It was 
also understandable, since Plaintiffs could not establish "a colorable claim" to the rents 
and/or ownership of the Provo property, that the trier of fact ruled on a motion in limine 
at a hearing on January 23, 2004, that the Court would: R. 8175 p. 108, Addendum D. 
"Preclude any claims that the plaintiffs were entitled to rent from the Provo 
property: The Court ruled that Plaintiffs may not claim any right or 
entitlement to money or rent from the Provo property. The Court sua 
sponte read into the record Judge Schofield's Ruling of October 2, 2001, 
wherein Judge Schofield stated in pertinent part, "...the property is owned 
by the trusts and the lease rents should be paid to the trusts." 
Additionally, at the hearing on July 26, 2004, Judge Stott ruled and Judge 
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Schofield later signed the Order regarding that hearing: 
"No. 4. That Defendants' Motion in Limine re: Plaintiffs' Alleged Adverse 
Possession Through Possession of a Tenant is granted in that plaintiffs may 
not present evidence at trial of possession by a tenant to establish the 
requirements of adverse possession. Because it is clear that plaintiffs' 
evidence relies upon such evidence to demonstrate adverse possession, this 
ruling effectively grants judgment in favor of defendants as to plaintiffs' 
cause of action for adverse possession and this issue is removed from 
consideration at trial. The Court finds that plaintiffs were not personally in 
possession of the Provo property at any time during the claimed adverse 
possession...Likewise, no adverse possession claim existed wherein the 
plaintiffs deeded valid title ownership of the Provo property to the 
Allred trustees in 1982 and 1983." 
R. 8082-8083. Addendum L. and Plaintiffs'Addendum C. 
Thus, all causes of action contained in Plaintiffs' Complaint had been dismissed. 
III. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT ESTABLISH ADVERSE POSSESSION 
CONSISTENT WITH UTAH STATUTES AND UTAH CASE LAW 
The enabling statute in Utah pertaining to a claim of Adverse Possession not 
under a written instrument or judgment, is Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-7 stating: 
78-12-7. Adverse possession - Possession presumed in owner. 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession 
thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the property shall be 
presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by 
law; and the occupation of the property by any other person shall be 
deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, 
unless it appears that the property has been held and possessed 
adversely to such legal title for seven years before the commencement 
of the action. 
In regard to the presumption of ownership by the legal title holder, the case of 
Frederiksen v. LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981) states as follows: 
The statutory presumption created by this section, that the legal title holder 
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is presumed to be in possession, does not satisfy Sec. 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-
5.2 requirement of actual occupancy or possession for purposes of tolling 
the running of the special statute of limitations for tax titles. 
It is interesting that this case should mention "actual occupancy" when it talks 
about possession, even though it relates to a different type of claim, i.e. a claim based on 
a tax title. Although this presumption does not apply to those claiming by tax titles, it 
would apply to the case at bar, where a tax title or other claim of right or writing is not 
present. Indeed, Plaintiffs have a difficult burden with the two quitclaim deeds executed 
by Plaintiffs in favor of the Allred Trusts, R. 2660, 2662 and the case of Baker v. Pattee, 
684 P.2d 632 Utah Supreme Court (1984) which specifically affirms: 
"Party attacking validity of written instrument such as a deed must do 
so by clear and convincing evidence," 
Plaintiffs have presented no clear and convincing evidence, or evidence of any 
sort, which would disprove the validity of the written instruments, i.e. the quitclaim 
deeds. The burden of proof is upon the Plaintiffs to demonstrate that the quitclaim deeds 
executed in 1982-1983 were not valid. Plaintiffs have not, at any time, met that burden. 
Further, in Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment dated December 11, 
2003, Plaintiffs admitted or stipulated that the deeds were effective to transfer ownership 
of the Provo property to the Trusts, wherein they stated: 
"For purposes of this motion only, it is accepted that the 1982-1983 
quitclaim deeds are construed to be effective to convey title to the 
Allred Trusts." R. 4330. Addendum E. 
Thus, any claim of invalidity of the Trusts' ownership in the Provo property has, by their 
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own words and actions, been fully extinguished. It has been further stated in Scott v. 
Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 303, 422 P.2d 525 (1966): 
"In action for possession of land, statute of limitations does not begin to 
run until true owner's right of possession has been so invaded as to give rise 
to cause of action so that when true owner's right to possession of land had 
not been so disturbed or encroached upon, statute did not begin to run." 
Thus, adverse possession is initiated when an individual occupies the land of 
another for seven years, possessing the land in an open, hostile and notorious manner so 
as to give notice to the legal owner, pays all the taxes assessed on the property, and makes 
various improvements thereon. 
Plaintiffs have cited several cases, Park West Village, Inc. v. Avise, 714 P.2d 1137 
(Utah 1986) and Bozievich v. Slechta, 109 Utah 373, 166 P.2d 239 (1946) and Adams v. 
Lamicq, 118 Utah 209, 221 P.2d 1037 (1950) wherein they assert that the parties in 
question initiated adverse possession procedure by placing tenants in possession and did 
not recognize any right of redemption in the original owners. As to the Park West 
Village case, the Court did not uphold possession based on the possession by the tenant, 
but by the twenty year possession by the claimant prior to the initiation of the action. The 
fact that claimant had a tenant was of absolutely no persuasive value in the Court's 
determination. 
The above mentioned cases and their holdings can be differentiated and 
distinguished from this case on two grounds: (1) the properties were claimed adversely 
under color of title, i.e. the claiming parties had purchased an interest in the property by 
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virtue of purchasing a tax or assessor's deed, and, (2) the tenant was placed on the 
property by the adverse claimant after or at the time of initiating the adverse possession 
claimed seven year period. And, it should here be noted that all the cases cited by 
Plaintiffs above apparently were superceded by Pender v. Jackson, 123 Utah 501, 260 
P.2d 542 (1953) which held: 
"...holding of property by real estate dealer for purposes of speculation, was 
not a holding for the ordinary use of the occupant and could not suffice as 
basis of claim of adverse possession." 
The Court, in adopting a rule from California in the case of Madson v. Cohn, 122 
Cal.App. 704, 10 P.2d 531, 532, states: 
"Hence, an open and notorious occupation with hostile intent is a necessary 
constituent of an adverse possession. Neither a hostile intent without such 
occupation, nor such occupation without hostile intent is sufficient." 
Quoting, once again, another California case, Weyse v. Biedebach, 86 Cal.App. 
736, 261 P. 1092, 1095, the Court states: 
"But to sustain a title by adverse possession it is incumbent upon the 
claimant to show actual, continued occupation and possession..., in addition 
to the payment of state, county, and municipal taxes levied and assessed 
upon the property...By reason of the foregoing rules, we affirm the trial 
court's finding that plaintiff was not in possession of the property as 
required by the adverse possession statute..." 
In the case at bar, the tenant, the telephone company, was already in place, and had 
been for eight years prior to the transfer of the property. And, as a matter of law and by 
contractual obligation under the lease, the rights and other legal obligations of the parties 
were covenants running with the land, and therefore, when the property was transferred to 
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the new owners, i.e. the Allred Trusts, the tenant became the tenant of the Trusts, 
pursuant to law and pursuant to the contract under which the property was leased. 
Therefore, the tenant who was in possession of the land was, from that time on, the tenant 
of the legal owner of the property, and not the tenant of the claimed adverse possessor 
who was the Plaintiff in this matter. 
This has been confirmed in numerous jurisdictions as follows: 
"When title passes, lessee ceases to hold under the grantor and he becomes 
a tenant of the grantee. Privity is automatically established between lessor's 
grantee and the lessee." Murphrey v. Winslow, 318 S.E. 2d 849 (N.C. 1984) 
"...Further, when a lessor sells property that is subject to an unfulfilled 
lease, the buyer takes the property subject to the terms of the lease." 
Watson v. Calvin, 9 S.W. 3d 571 (Ark. 2002) 
"The Court also said as a preliminary matter, a conveyance of land, which is 
subject to a valid and continuing lease, passes to the purchaser the right to 
collect rent thereafter accruing...When title passes, lessee ceases to hold 
under the grantor. He then becomes a tenant of the grantee, and his 
possession is grantee's possession." Pearce v. Gay, 139 S.E. 2d 567 (1965) 
"...Purchaser of land became landlord upon the transfer of the property to 
him...A sale by the lessor of real estate, during the unexpired leasehold term 
under which the tenant is holding does not, of itself, abrogate the lease, 
determine the leasehold estate, or authorize the landlord or the tenant to 
treat the lease as to an end." Edmund H. Blankenau v. Landess, 626 N.W. 
2d 588 (Nebraska 2001) 
"...Its' effect is to grant all the rights of the original landlord to the grantee 
of the reversion. Id. The grantee then becomes the landlord by operation of 
law, and the tenant becomes the tenant of the grantee of the reversion. Id." 
Kirk Corp. V. First American Title Co., 220 Cal. App. 3d 785, 270 Cal. 
Rptr.24(1990) 
At the time of the transfer of the Provo property from the grantor, David Allred, to 
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the grantee, the Trusts, there was obviously a specific and explicit understanding that 
transfer of the property was also transfer of the rights and obligations under the 1974 
lease with the telephone company, since Article XIV of the telephone company lease 
agreement called for it, wherein it stated: R. 2010. Addendum F. 
ARTICLE XIV Successors and Assigns 
The terms, conditions and provisions of this lease shall inure to the 
benefit of and be binding upon the respective parties hereto, the 
personal representatives, executor and administrators of the Owner, 
and the successors and assigns of both Owner and Tenant 
In furtherance of grantors' plan to divest themselves of the property through the 
creation of the Allred Trusts, they incorporated the terms and conditions of Section 
Fourteen in the Allred Trust documents, which stated: R. 5367, Addendum B. 
SECTION FOURTEEN 
Revocation and Amendment 
This trust shall be irrevocable and shall not be altered, amended, 
revoked or terminated by trustor or any other person. Trustor hereby 
declares that his purpose in establishing the trust is to provide for the 
housing, material comforts of the beneficiaries during their lives and by 
this agreement trustor relinquishes absolutely and forever all his 
possession or enjoyment of, or right to the income from, the Trust 
Estate, and all his right and power whether alone or in conjunction 
with others to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the 
Trust Estate or the income therefrom. Trustor hereby renounces for 
himself and his estate any interest, either vested or contingent including 
any reversionary right or possibility or reverting the principal and 
income of the trust. 
It thus becomes patently obvious that Plaintiffs' intention, pursuant to the terms of 
the trust agreement created by Plaintiffs, was to divest themselves of all right and title to 
the Provo property, and all right and claim to any income which might be generated from 
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the rents of the Provo property. Had this not been their intention, Plaintiffs certainly 
would not have included Section Fourteen in the trust documents they executed 
December 1982. 
. IV. PLAINTIFFS' USE OF AND RELIANCE UPON SECTION 78-12-14 
UCA ANNOTATED (1953) IS ERRONEOUS AND IS A MISUSE 
AND MISCONSTRUING OF THE STATUTE. 
Section 78-12-14 Possession of tenant deemed possession of landlord: 
When the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any 
persons, the possession of the tenant is deemed the possession of the 
landlord until the expiration of seven years from the termination of the 
tenancy, or, where there has been no written lease, until the expiration 
of seven years from the time of the last payment of rent, 
notwithstanding that such tenant may have acquired another title, or 
may have claimed to hold adversely to his landlord; but such 
presumption cannot be made after the periods herein limited. 
This statute does not grant authority in the State of Utah for the proposition 
Plaintiffs are trying to advocate. Plaintiffs are claiming that under UCA Section 78-12-
14, they, Plaintiffs, are deemed to be in possession of the property as against the world. 
That is not the intent of this statute. The tenant possesses the property by virtue of its' 
lease. Plaintiffs claim to be the landlord, but by law relinquished any claim to that status 
in 1982 when they executed the quitclaim deeds, the Trust agreements, and the 1974 lease 
with the telephone company. Plaintiffs' claim against the title holder has to be 
determined by applicable law, and as a matter of law, Plaintiffs no longer have any claim 
as to the property, the rents, or possession, and after 1982, cannot claim to be landlords. 
Section 78-12-14 is simply to protect the rights of a landlord as against a tenant 
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when the tenant is occupying the premises either by a contract or by a month to month 
tenancy or a tenancy by sufferance. This statute prevents the tenant from claiming 
adverse possession against the landlord and prevents a tenant who is renting to believe he 
is somehow acquiring some type of adverse ownership interest. The purpose is to protect 
the landlord and not to enable and empower the tenant, or a third party, such as Plaintiffs. 
It is obvious this is a specific situation and the statute covers only a situation 
existing between a landlord and a tenant. It is also very clear that in this case, Plaintiffs 
have tried to position themselves as landlords and claim the rights which might be held by 
the tenants as accruing to the landlord, however, Plaintiffs are not the tenant either. 
Likewise, they abdicated their position as landlord and owner when they executed the 
quitclaim deeds in 1982 and 1983. 
This seems to be an easily understood statute and goes hand in hand with other 
cases which equate the landlord with the owner of the property. One would think that if 
the statute were to be interpreted as the Plaintiffs advocate, there would be various cases 
in the State of Utah agreeing with their position, but there are none. 
However, the State of New York, which has a statute similar to UCA Section 78-
12-14, clarifies the meaning of the statute in the case of Bradt v. Giovannone 35 A.D 2d 
322 315 NYS 2d 961 (1970), as follows: 
"Generally, possession of tenant is not deemed adverse to his landlord so as 
to enable tenant to acquire title as against landlord by adverse possession, 
but such rule only circumscribes tenant's power in relation to his landlord 
and not against the whole world." 
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Obviously, the intent of the statute as indicated by this case, is to clarify a tenant's 
position as against that of the landlord, and the landlord only, and does not stretch so far 
as to encompass the whole world. Tenant, Qwest, has made no claims against the legal 
owner, and in fact, as a tenant, has ratified the position of the Allred Trusts as the owner 
of the property and as their landlord. 
A. The Allred Trusts Are The Owners And The Landlords 
Regardless of how Plaintiffs attempt to construe Section 78-12-14, one fact 
remains: As a matter of law, the Trusts are the legal owners of the Provo property. This is 
shown by the 1982-1983 quitclaim deeds, by the terms of the 1974 telephone company 
lease, and by the terms of the 1982 Trusts. All of these documents declare and support 
the Court's finding that the Trusts are the landlords and the legal owners of the Provo 
property. 
According to the case of Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 
467(Utah 1989) cited in Interstate Land Corporation v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101 (Utah 
APP 1990), the Court states: 
"A party holding legal title to the property is presumed to be "in 
possession" of it." 
Presumptions require "clear and convincing " evidence to rebut the presumption. 
No proof has been forthcoming. Absent a binding written document, no one other than 
the legal owner can claim possession of the Provo property. 
The 1999 Hawaii case of Pioneer Mill Co., Ltd. v. Dow, 978 P.2d 727 stated: 
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"If the adverse claimant's occupation of the land was permissive in its 
inception the presumption was that it continued to be of the same nature and 
the burden was upon the adverse claimant to prove that by words or acts 
sufficient to give notice to the contrary to an ordinarily prudent and vigilant 
owner he the defendant, had changed its character and was thereafter 
occupying adversely. Possession once shown to have been at its inception 
permissive or in subordination to the true owner's title, is presumed, in the 
absence of any showing to the contrary, to continue of the same character, 
and the burden is on the possessor to show that it thereafter became 
hostile." 
The 1999 Utah case of Edgell v. Canning, 976 P.2d 1193 agrees with the Hawaii 
case when it states: 
"Where use of another's land begins as permissive, the party asserting that 
it afterward became adverse has the burden to show when the use changed 
from permissive to adverse." 
And in 2000, another Utah case followed, Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline 
Corp., 5 P.3d 1206, stating: 
"The presumption is against the acquisition of a right by adverse use, 
and the burden of proof is upon the party asserting the right." 
Plaintiffs have not, and are not, able to either establish or prove their assertion of 
adverse possession. They allege their possession continued following the execution and 
recording of the quitclaim deeds in 1982-1983, yet fail to mention that any actions which 
they took during this time were with the express permission of the Trusts. No evidence 
has been presented showing that in any way, prior to 1991, Plaintiffs took any action or 
communicated in any way with the Trusts in an open, hostile and notorious way. 
Subsequent to 1991, Plaintiffs made numerous requests and produced numerous 
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letters, R. 2463-2474, 2545-2548, none of which indicated that Plaintiffs were claiming 
the Provo property adversely, in an open, hostile or notorious way. To the contrary, 
Plaintiffs continually manifested, both explicitly and impliedly, the validity of the Trusts' 
legal ownership of the property, by continuously requesting the trustee of the Trusts to 
reconvey the Provo property to them. Such requests were in explicit recognition that the 
Trusts held the legal title and ownership to the Provo property. Needless to say, never 
did Plaintiffs, at any time, make the assertion that Qwest was their tenant or that they 
were asserting adverse possession through the tenancy of Qwest 
B. The Familial Relationship Between The Plaintiffs And The Trustee Was 
Never Strained By Claims Of Adverse Possession-There Were None 
Additionally, during this time, Plaintiffs continued their familial relationship with 
their son, the trustee, and other beneficiaries of the Allred Trusts. Such familial 
relationship was never strained by claims of adverse possession by Plaintiffs because 
there were no claims of adverse possession made by Plaintiffs. It has long been 
recognized that: 
"Where the relationship of father and son exists between the parties in 
possession of land, the possession of the land of the one by the other is 
presumed to be permissive and not adverse; and to make such possession 
adverse there must be some open assertion of hostile title, other than mere 
possession notice of which assertion must be brought home to the owner of 
the land..." 
"Where a father conveyed real estate to his son without consideration, and 
thereafter remained in possession, the legal presumption is that the 
possession of the father was in accordance with the deed..." 
Collins et at v. Colleran et ai, 90 N.W. 364 Supreme Ct. Minn. (1902) 
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The Supreme Court of Idaho, in 1984, recognized the same principle in the case of 
Berg v. Fairman, 690 P.2d 896 (1984) when it held: 
"When one occupies land of a blood relative, such occupation is 
presumptively with permission of true owner..." 
In the case of Sheppick v. Sheppick et aL, 138 P. 1169 Utah (1914), the Court held: 
"In an action to quiet title, where plaintiff established his legal title to land 
in the possession of defendant, his father, evidence held insufficient to 
show defendant's possession was adverse...there is nothing in this case 
upon which a claim of adverse possession can successfully be based." 
C. Plaintiffs' Claim To Have Collected The Rent Is Manifestly Untrue 
Plaintiffs, in conjunction with UCA 78-12-14, attempt to persuade the Court that 
they have collected the rents from the Provo property. This is not true, in fact, it is 
manifestly untrue. Plaintiffs attempt to suggest that they are the landlord, even though 
they divested themselves of the Provo Property, by their own admission, in 1982. In 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment submitted 
December 11, 2003, they state: R. 4330. Addendum E. 
"For purposes of this motion only, it is accepted that the 1982-1983 
quitclaim deeds are construed to be effective to convey title to the 
Allred Trusts." 
Ownership of the Provo property by the Allred Trusts is also a fact which has been 
established by the Court on at least two occasions by two separate rulings by two separate 
judges, and which Plaintiffs have admitted, as of late, in order to further their adverse 
possession claim. R. 1199-1208, 5904-5910, 8081-8085, Plaintiffs' Addendum A, B, C. 
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As a matter of established fact, the Provo property rents were paid and distributed 
pursuant to the terms of a document claimed to have been written by David Allred, 
entitled, "Memorandum To Our Executrix, Mary Allred Jensen", delineated Bates 0771. 
R. 2658. Addendum H. This document states that $300.00 each month was deposited to 
an account at Zions Bank for Stephen Allred as signatory along with his parents, and 
$296.69 was deposited to an account at Tracy Collins Bank for Richard G. Allred, 
Trustee and signatory on the account, along with his parents. David Allred stated: 
"This account will continue to receive the $300 monthly payment as 
long as the Telephone Company extends its contract...The Telephone 
Company has been instructed to divide the returns of the contract and 
any additional option exercised to each of the above accounts...At our 
death, the account becomes Richard's." (Emphasis Added) 
And, although Plaintiffs assert that they directed, administered, claimed the rent 
and so forth, the facts, pursuant to their own document, demonstrate that the actual 
situation was considerably different than that asserted by Plaintiffs. R. 2658 Addendum 
H. And their assertions are definitively proven to the contrary when you examine 
Stephen Allred's continued use and withdrawal of the funds from the specifically 
designated Zions Bank Account for a period in excess often years. 
D. Telephone Company Lease Article XIV, By Contract And As A 
Matter of Law, Transferred Qwests' Tenancy to New Owner 
Additionally, Article XIV of the 1974 telephone company lease, as a matter of law 
and as a matter of contract, triggered the transfer of the tenant, Qwest, to the new owner, 
the Allred Trusts, on December 30, 1982 when the Trusts were executed. R. 2010 Add. F. 
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Likewise, Section Fourteen, Revocation and Amendment, of the Allred Trust 
documents created in 1982 by David Allred, state that "...by this agreement trustor 
relinquishes absolutely and forever all his possession or enjoyment of, or right to the 
income from, the Trust Estate..." (Emphasis Added) R. 5367 Addendum B. 
In reality, then, Plaintiffs not only cannot claim any authority over the principal of 
the Trust, but by the very nature of their contractual agreement under the terms of the 
Trusts, cannot claim any of the rent or income from the Trust Estate. R.5367 Add. B. 
It should be kept in mind that this preclusion as to the claims of ownership or 
rights to receive the rents, did not come from an external source, but was imposed by 
David Allred, by virtue of his creating the Allred Trusts in 1982. 
Lest Plaintiffs should claim some abnormality in the creation of the Trusts, please 
take judicial notice that Plaintiff David Allred created and executed identical trust 
documents four years earlier in 1978 for the benefit of his daughter and her family in 
conveying an eleven acre parcel of land to them. R 2677-2687, 2689-2690. Addendum C. 
V. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS DAVID AND 
INEZ ALLRED ON THEIR ADVERSE POSSESSION CLAIM-
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on July 25, 2002 in regard to all 
of Plaintiffs' causes of action. A hearing on this motion came up in December 2002, 
wherein the Plaintiffs asked for additional time. Thus, the Summary Judgment Motion by 
Defendants was amended and submitted again to the Court, and came up for hearing on 
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April 3, 2003. The Court ruled on this motion that there were disputed facts which 
precluded the summary judgment ruling and thus, a third motion for summary judgment 
was filed by Defendants and the Plaintiffs filed a counter motion for summary judgment 
in regard to their adverse possession claim, which hearing was held on January 23, 2004 
and a memorandum ruling was made on February 6, 2004. R.5904-5910 PL Addendum B 
In this memorandum ruling, Judge Stott, the trier of fact, ruled that the First, 
Second, Third, Fourth and Sixth causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations. 
The Court continued to discuss the two motions for summary judgment in regard to 
adverse possession and ruled that there were genuine issues of material fact and questions 
of law which precluded the Court from granting either motion. The Court cited there 
were disputes as to who paid the taxes on the property, whether the parties, i.e. the 
Plaintiffs were in actual possession, open and notorious to a claim of ownership and 
whether the Plaintiffs were in exclusive possession of the property during the time in 
question, as well as other issues. Thus, neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendants received 
a favorable ruling in regard to their motions regarding adverse possession at this hearing. 
A. Lower Court Did Not Err In Ruling Plaintiffs Were Not Occupiers 
And Could Not Claim Rent Or Income From The Provo Property 
The trier of fact did rule in regard to Plaintiffs' adverse possession claims on July 
26, 2004, the date set for trial of this matter. The Court had previously ruled on a motion 
in limine, that Plaintiffs could not claim the rent or income from the Provo property and 
had upheld the law of the case, wherein it was declared that the Trusts were the owner of 
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the Provo property, and had been for a long time and were entitled to the rents and 
proceeds therefrom. R. 8081-8085. Plaintiffs' Addendum C. 
Thus, as can be seen from the foregoing arguments in this brief, Plaintiffs, as of 
the time of the execution of the quitclaim deeds in 1982 and 1983, were not the owners of 
the Provo property, were not the landlords of the Provo property, and were not the 
occupiers of the Provo property, and could not claim to be occupying the Provo property. 
Since the telephone company paid or reimbursed the property taxes and since 
Plaintiffs were not the landlords subsequent to the execution of the quitclaim deeds in 
1982 and 1983, and since Plaintiffs were not occupying the premises in an open, 
notorious and hostile manner, they could not present at trial any evidence claiming to 
have done such. R. 8082-8083. Plaintiffs' Addendum C. Thus, the motion in limine and 
its ruling, effectively eclipsed any claim Plaintiffs might have to the Provo property, and 
ended the Plaintiffs' case before it began, as was proper, since they had no documents or 
other evidence with which to prove their case. 
Thus, based on the fact that Plaintiffs had no documentary evidence, could not 
meet their burden of proof, could not claim any interest in the Provo property by virtue of 
the parol evidence rule, the statute of frauds, and the documents which they had signed, 
the Court ruled properly and did not err. 
VI. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
UTAH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD RUN ON PLAINTIFFS' 
FRAUD AND BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS, AND 
THAT THE STATUTE WAS NOT TOLLED. 
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Section 78-12-26 UCA provides a three year statute of limitations "for relief on the 
ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in such case does not accrue 
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." 
Section 78-12-25 UCA provides "an action may be brought within four years for 
relief not otherwise provided for by law." This section was cited in Kamas SEC Co, v. 
Taylor, 226 P.2d 111 (1950) which states: "Action clearly involved a breach of fiduciary 
duty, a four year limitation on action for relief not otherwise provided for was applicable. 
The elements of fraud have been described as follows: (1) That representation was 
made; (2) Concerning a presently existing material fact; (3) Which was false; (4) Which 
the representor either knew to be false or made recklessly knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such representations; (5) For the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) That the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) Did, in fact, rely upon it; (8) And was thereby induced to act; 
(9) To his injury and damage. Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 
2001Ut.25P.3dl98. 
Plaintiffs, in quoting a letter from David Allred, R. 4342 claim that in [June 1976] 
they were told they were paying too much income tax. Thus, 1976 appears to be the date 
Plaintiffs assert representations were made regarding their income tax. Although their 
statements are not true, they are nevertheless far too remote in time to comply with the 
current elements of fraud, since the time between the alleged representation and the 
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alleged action was six to eight years and would not qualify as....[2] "Concerning a 
presently existing material fact." See Franco v. Church of Jesus Christ o/LDS, Id.. 
It would appear that fraud and breach of fiduciary duty are somewhat intertwined, 
as causes of action, and therefore, this Court has found that: 
"Finding of fraud must be based on existence of all essential elements..." 
Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102 (Utah 1984). 
"Burden is upon party charging fraud to prove fraud by clear and 
convincing evidence." Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873 (Utah 1978) 
"Fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or, stated another 
way, by clear preponderance of evidence." Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. 
Sohrn, 391 P.2d 293 (Utah 1964) 
"We believe that the rule in Bradbury (401 P.2d at 713) reflects the current 
State of Utah law, i.e. the relationship of parent and child does not, in and 
of itself, establish a confidential relationship giving rise to a presumption of 
unfair dealing as in Jones. " Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345 quoting Bradbury 
v. Rasmussen} 401 P.2d 710 ( Utah 1965) 
Plaintiffs claim equitable estoppel and the "special circumstances exception" bar 
the statute of limitations defense. They have continued to assert they are entitled to an 
endless extension or tolling of the statute of limitations. 
But the fact is, David and Inez Allred knew, and lately have admitted, that in 
December 1982, David Allred as trustor, created nine separate irrevocable trusts. A 
quitclaim deed was executed in 1982 which conveyed 50% interest in the Provo property 
from Plaintiffs to the Allred Trusts. R. 2662 In 1983, an additional quitclaim deed was 
prepared and recorded conveying the remaining 50% interest in the Provo property to the 
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Allred Trusts. David and Inez Allred admitted in their Complaint they signed these 
transfer documents. R. 5905. In 1991, David Allred claimed "he discovered for the first 
time" about the Provo property conveyance to the Trusts. R. 0001-0028, p. 7. In January 
1992, he conferred with his attorney and by his own admissions in his letter of May 20, 
1992, he recited the various actions he had taken. R. 5904-5910. Plaintiffs' Addendum B 
The Court found that David Allred was fully cognizant of the circumstances, had 
advice and counsel from his attorney, threatened legal action, and allowed the statute to 
run having full knowledge of the quitclaim deeds, the Trusts, and their effect. R. 5904-
5910. Plaintiffs' Addendum B. R. 2662, 2660, 5367-5370, 2677-2690. Addendum B, C. 
Of course David Allred had full knowledge of the effect of the deeds and trusts. 
He had just effectuated an identical transaction four years earlier in 1978, where he used 
documents identical in every way, to convey a parcel of land to his daughter and her 
- family in the exact same manner. R. 2677-2687, 2689-2690, Addendum C. Thus, for 
Plaintiffs to now claim that they are entitled to equitable estoppel and "special 
circumstances exemption" is not credible and is without merit. 
Plaintiffs have not in this action previously pled equitable estoppel or claimed the 
"special circumstances exemption". It is believed that the rules of appellate procedure 
preclude the introduction of new claims, or the introduction of new evidence not 
previously pled or introduced at the trial court level. Plaintiffs may not now address new 
arguments or plead new matters at the appellate level. 
A. Plaintiffs Make Allegations Of Fraud Yet Provide No 
Documents or Testimony to Prove Their Claim 
Plaintiffs have made numerous and repetitious allegations regarding alleged fraud 
in this case. However, they have produced no evidence of fraud and cannot produce 
evidence because there was no fraud. Even Inez Allred, their principle witness, has not 
been able to substantiate their claims. An actual look her testimony shows it to be 
diametrically opposed to Plaintiffs' groundless allegations. 
Statement Source 
Regarding "Repeated overtures and assertions" 
Inez declared, "I don't know what you talked 
about sometimes in our library." 
Regarding alleged tax savings by signing deeds, 
Inez replied "He never discussed it with me." 
Regarding presentation of quitclaim deeds for 
signing, Inez replied, "My husband presented it." 
Richard Allred was not present when the 
quitclaim deeds were signed. Inez stated, 
"You weren't there when I signed it." 
Thus, no "force and coerce" 
Regarding the reconveyance of Provo property, 
"Richard always said "No". 
Regarding legal ownership of Provo property, 
Inez said, "We thought we did because you 
"aIIowed"us to take care of it for ten years." 
Richard Allred provided no attorney services for 
Provo property, "I can't remember of any 
services he provided for the Provo property. 
My husband, David, did those things." 
Inez H. Allred, Deposition II 
July 1, 2002, Page 144, R. 2633* 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, p. 5 No. 19 
Inez H. Allred, Deposition I 
July 5, 2001, Page 45, R. 2399* 
R. 2418, 2399 
Inez H. Allred, Deposition I 
July 5, 2001, Page 41, R. 0559* 
Inez H. Allred, Deposition II 
July 1, 2002, Page 105, 107, 223, 
Page 224, R. 2595, 2597, 2598* 
Complaint p. 11, No. 37(e). 
Inez H. Allred, Deposition II 
July 1, 2002, Page 216-217, 219 
R. 2619, 2620* 
Inez H. Allred, Deposition II 
July 1, 2002, Page 175, R. 2623* 
Inez H. Allred, Deposition I 
July 5, 2001, Page 36, R. 0566 
*See Addendum O for R. 
and Deposition Pages 
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Thus, this brief comparison of allegations made by Plaintiffs as compared to the 
actual testimony of Inez Allred, demonstrates conclusively, that Plaintiffs' accusations 
are without merit. Even when Plaintiff Inez Allred was asked the simple question: 
"Did you sign the quitclaim deeds?" she was unreliable and contradictory in her 
responses: Addendum P. 
Affidavit: "I did not sign the December 1982 deed on December 30, 1982." 
Affidavit: "I did not sign the December 1982 deed on December 30, 1982." 
Admissions: "Inez H. Allred...does not believe that she signed Exhibit No. 30." 
Errata "...Inez H. Allred and David H. Allred signed the two Quit Claim Deeds." 
Additionally, when Inez was questioned about signing the Allred Trusts, she 
claimed she did not sign them and had never seen them until June 2001. R. 8171 p.52 
Addendum P Yet it is obvious that it was her signature on the quitclaim deeds and the 
trust documents which were signed nine times before a notary on December 30, 1982. 
After repeated denials, the Plaintiffs now state in their appellate brief, page 7, "It was 
understandable that David and Inez had forgotten about the deeds.-." Thus, these 
representations, under oath, by Inez Allred, demonstrate definitively that in spite of 
Plaintiffs' many, many allegations and the barrage of rhetoric, Plaintiffs' case has no 
merit. Plaintiffs have no evidence and did not and can not meet their burden of proof. 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion one must reach is that although Plaintiffs have fabricated a good 
story, they have produced absolutely no evidence, documents, admissible testimony or 
proof of any nature which might substantiate their claims. This became clear early on 
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when Judge Schofield ruled in 2001 that the Trusts owned the Provo property and had for 
many years. Judge Stott, as trier of fact, and upon hearing further testimony from both 
sides, reaffirmed that "...David H. Allred as trustor had created nine separate irrevocable 
trusts..." and that the Provo property have been lawfully quit claimed to them many years 
before. The Trusts owned the property and were entitled to the rents. And, any claim of 
open, notorious, and hostile possession adversely held by David and Inez Allred is simply 
not supported by the facts of the case. R. 8175, p. 108-109, Addendum D. R. 5909, 
Plaintiffs' Addendum B. 
It has, thus, been concluded by two separate lower court judges that based upon the 
documents presented, David and Inez Allred conveyed the Provo property in 1982 and 
1983 to the Allred Trusts and that such conveyances were lawful and binding and were 
recognized by the Court as conveying away all ownership and rights they had thereto. 
These findings, carefully formulated and based upon numerous rulings and a 
thorough analysis of the evidence presented, were the Findings of Fact by the Fourth 
Judicial District Court and should be affirmed. 
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CROSS APPEAL OF 
OVERRULING OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
IN A CIVIL CASE 
CROSS APPEAL STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is a cross appeal of a final judgment in a civil case. The original 
judgment was entered in Fourth District Court on September 22, 2004 by the Honorable 
Gary D. Stott and was subsequently overruled in Fourth District Court on July 28, 2005 by 
the Honorable Anthony W. Schofield. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Section 78-2-2(3)(j) and Section 78-2a3(3). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower Court err in allowing Plaintiffs' untimely motion of January 
20, 2005 to be heard? This issue was preserved at R. 7673-7692, R. 7399- 7411. This 
ruling should be reviewed under the "summary judgment statute, since it involves only legal 
conclusions, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court." 
Martin v. Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
2. Did the lower Court err in referring back to and overruling the September 
22, 2004 hearing and order when the motion did not mention this hearing? This issue was 
preserved at R. 7399-7411. The applicable rule of this matter is URCP Rule 12(h). The 
standard of review is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Stokes v. Van Wagner, 987 
P.2d 602 (Utah 1999). 
3. Did the lower Court err in finding that the trustee waived the right to the 
rents, in light of Section Fourteen of the trust agreement, wherein Plaintiffs repudiated any 
possible claim or right to the rents? The issue was preserved at R. 7399-7411. This is 
reviewable under summary judgment standard, since it involves only legal conclusions, 
"which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court." Martin v. 
Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah Ct Appl 1996). 
4. Did the lower Court err in failing to take judicial notice of the ruling in a 
motion in limine precluding any claims that the Plaintiffs were entitled to rent from the 
Provo property? This issue was preserved at R. 7399-7411. This ruling was a question of 
law, reviewable under the summary judgment standard which involves only legal 
conclusions, "which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court." 
Martin v. Kearl 917 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
5. Did the lower Court err in granting relief above and beyond the relief 
prayed for? This issue was preserved at R. 7399-7411. The applicable rule of this matter is 
URCP 12(h). The standard of review is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Stokes v. Van Wagner, 987 P.2d 602 (Utah 1999). 
6. Did the lower Court err in overruling a final judgment entered by a judge of 
concurrent authority and jurisdiction? This issue was preserved at R. 7399-7411. This is a 
question of law, reviewable for correctness. Stokes v. Van Wagner, 987 P.2d 602 (Utah 1999). 
This is supported by the case of Nelson v. Salt Lake City School Board, 645 P.2d 658. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
For Full Text of Statutes and Rules Refer to Addendum A 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 7(f)(2) Orders. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 7(f)(1) Orders. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 12(h) Waiver of defenses. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 59(a) Grounds. 
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 59(b) Time for motion. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This cross appeal is from a judgment rendered by the Honorable Anthony W. 
Schofield in Fourth District Court setting aside the final judgment which was entered on 
September 22, 2004 by the Honorable Gary D. Stott in Fourth District Court. 
This case, and more particularly this counter-claim, had been tried and adjudicated by 
Judge Stott. A hearing was held in Fourth District Court, on September 22, 2004. The 
Court found for the Defendants that the rent proceeds during the limited statutory period of 
March 1998 to August 2001 were in the amount of $127,800.00. The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law together with an Order in regard to the September 22, 2004 hearing 
stated: 
"Judgment in favor of the Allred Trusts as against Plaintiffs should be 
entered in the amount of $127,800.00...IT IS HEREBY ORDERED..." 
The Court ordered Mr. Carlston, attorney for Plaintiffs, to prepare the order 
appropriately for the ruling. Mr. Carlston agreed. Mr. Carlston then asked the Court for 
permission to prepare an order for the July 26, 2004 hearing, as well. R. 8166, 6941, Add. G. 
Plaintiffs' counsel prepared the final order and judgment for each hearing and 
submitted them to Defendants on November 19, 2004. However, Plaintiffs never filed the 
orders with the Court. This is contrary to URCP Rule 7(f)(2) and 7(f)(1). Addendum A. 
R. 7724-7730. R. 7724-7730. Addendum I. 
In the interim, Judge Stott was rotated off this case and Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
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took his place. Plaintiffs then filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Memorandum Decision or 
for New Trial on January 28, 2005. Plaintiffs requested that the word stipulate be excised 
from the January 11, 2005 Memorandum Decision. R. 7356-7362, 7194-7198. Addendum J. 
The Court eventually granted Plaintiffs' motion, and in addition, set aside Judge 
Stott's judgment of September 22, 2004 on the basis that it had not become final. The 
proposed order and judgment was never filed by Plaintiffs' counsel as required by URCP 
7(f)(2). Addendum A. R. 6941 -6943. 
The Court set aside the September 22, 2004 ruling, entered a new ruling after a short 
evidentiary hearing, and therefore deprived Defendants of their previous judgment in the 
amount of $127,800.00. R.7600-7602. Addendum G. Addendum K. 
The issues here are that the Court incorrectly allowed Plaintiffs relief in regard to the 
September 22, 2004 hearing, particularly in light of their failure to follow the rules in 
preparing and filing the order and judgment as ordered by the Court to do, and set aside the 
previous ruling and judgment without any statutory basis, and without any statutory reasons 
pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) and Rule 7(f)(1), Rule 59(a) and Rule 59(b) and Rule 12(h) as well 
as the declarations contained in Section Fourteen of the trusts wherein "trustor relinquishes 
absolutely and forever all his possession or enjoyment of, or right to the income from, the 
Trust Estate..." Further, the Court ignored the order regarding Defendants' motion in limine 
which precluded Plaintiffs from making any claim of entitlement to the rent proceeds from 
the Provo property. R. 5367-5370. Addendum B. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
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A. Plaintiffs' January 28, 2005 motion was untimely due to the misfeasance of 
Plaintiffs' counsel in not filing an order as ordered by the Court on September 22, 2004. 
B. Plaintiffs' motion was only in regard to the December 17, 2004 and January 
11, 2005 order and did not apply to the September 22, 2004 ruling, order and judgment. 
C. Due to Plaintiffs' inaction, the final judgment was not entered. Plaintiffs 
should not benefit by their own malfeasance. R.6941-6943, 7724-7730. Addendum G. 
D. Plaintiffs could claim no right to the rent proceeds from the Provo property. 
They repudiated the right in Section Fourteen of the trust agreement, and, the Court had 
ruled they could not claim Plaintiffs were entitled to rent from the Provo property. 
E. Likewise, the law of the case as explicitly stated by the Court on October 2, 
200land reaffirmed on many different occasions, stated: "...The property leased by Qwest is 
owned by the trusts...on the face of the documents provided by the parties, the property is 
owned by the trusts and the lease rents should be paid to the trusts."R.1207, PL Add. A 
F. Plaintiffs could not make a claim for the rents due to the ruling of the motion 
in limine, and Section Fourteen of the trusts that stated they: "Relinquished absolutely and 
forever all his possession or enjoyment of, or right to the income from , the Trust Estate..." 
R. 8175, p 108-109. R. 5367-5370. Addendum D and B. 
G. The newly rotated judge exceeded his authority in retrying various aspects 
of the case which had already been adjudicated by the trier of fact. Changes and 
amendments to judgments as well as rehearings should follow the procedure for such 
overruling of previous orders and judgments and should be in strict conformance with 
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URCP Rule 59(a) and Rule 59(b). Some type of proof or evidence that good cause exists 
must also be submitted. 
ARGUMENT 
L DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS' 
UNTIMELY MOTION OF JANUARY 28, 2005 TO BE HEARD. 
On January 28, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Alter or Amend 
Memorandum Decision or For New Trial in Fourth District Court. The Motion requested 
that the Court revise or amend statements from the January 11, 2005 order which stated 
Plaintiffs stipulated to owing The Allred Trusts an amount of money. R. 7356-6943 Ad J. 
Citing the case of Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 159, 162-163 (Utah 
l969)(q\ioting Dettamanti v. Lampoc Union School District, 143 Cal.App.2d 715,300 P.2d 
78, 81 (1956)) it states: 
"Where the delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of the 
defendant it cannot be availed of by him as a defense." 
In this case, Plaintiffs' counsel was ordered to prepare the judgment and orders for 
the September 22, 2004 hearing, and yet failed to file them, and as a result, gained the 
advantage of another hearing with a newly rotated judge who may or may not have been 
fully informed on many preceding matters, rulings and orders. R. 6941-6943, 7724-7730. 
Without presenting any reason, Plaintiffs were allowed to profit from their own 
malfeasance. The Court erred in allowing the January 28, 2005 motion to be heard without 
justifiable and demonstrable reasons as are outlined in Rule 59(a) and 59(b) URCP, and 
granted relief not within the scope of the motion. Addendum G and I. 
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II. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN REFERRING BACK TO THE 
SEPTEMBER 22,2004 HEARING WHEN THE MOTION DID NOT 
MENTION SUCH HEARING. 
On January 28, 2005, Plaintiffs' filed a Motion To Alter Or Amend Memorandum 
Decision Or For New Trial. R.7356-7362, 7194-7198 Ad. J. The Memorandum Decision 
issued by Judge Stott is the ruling of January 11, 2005, ruling on the issues decided at the 
hearing of December 17, 2004. Since this was the prayer of Plaintiff s Motion, the Court 
overstepped its' bounds by granting Plaintiffs far more relief than they prayed for. 
Plaintiffs, at the new hearing, referred back to the ruling of September 22, 2004 as 
part of their argument. In allowing Plaintiffs to discuss issues from the September 22, 2004 
hearing when their motion made no mention of this hearing, the Court erred. 
III. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE TRUSTEE 
WAIVED THE RIGHT TO THE RENTS, IN LIGHT OF SECTION 
FOURTEEN OF THE TRUSTS WHEREIN PLAINTIFFS 
REPUDIATED THEIR RIGHTS TO THE RENTS, 
The trust agreements executed by Plaintiffs contained specific language in Section 
Fourteen, stating that Plaintiffs relinquished "absolutely and forever", all their possession or 
right to the income from the Provo property. R. 5367-5370. Addendum B. 
In light of the above, how, then, could the trustee waive the right to the rents back to 
the Plaintiffs? The Courts' ruling of waiver appears to pertain to income tax preparation by 
trustee during the years 1994 to 1997. Based upon that thinking, however, there could be no 
waiver after 1997 since the trustee provided no tax preparation for Plaintiffs after 1997. 
And, the very refusal of the trustee to prepare the tax returns after 1997, was an action, at the 
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very least, repudiating any future waiver. Thus, the Court erred in finding that the trustee 
waived the rights of the Trusts to the rent proceeds in favor of Plaintiffs. 
IV. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN FAILING TO TAKE JUDICIAL 
NOTICE OF THE RULING ON A MOTION IN LIMINE 
PRECLUDING ANY CLAIMS THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE 
ENTITLED TO RENT FROM THE PROVO PROPERTY. 
Judge Stott, at a pre-trial hearing on January 23, 2004, granted a motion in limine 
brought specifically for the purpose of limiting any testimony as to claims that Plaintiffs 
were entitled to rent from the Provo property states: R. 8175, p. 108, Addendum D. 
"Seventh, preclude any claims that the plaintiffs were entitled to rent 
from the Provo property..," 
Judge Stott continued on and read Judge Schofield's October 2, 2001 ruling, stating: 
"...Though plaintiffs assert that they have a colorable claim to the lease 
rents, I don't see it. Rather, on the face of the documents provided by the 
parties, the property is owned by the trusts and the lease rents should be 
paid to the trusts..." R. 1207 Plaintiffs' Addendum A 
Therefore, any claims made by Plaintiffs that they were entitled to the rents was set 
to rest by these rulings of Judge Schofield and Judge Stott. Plaintiff could not even cross 
the threshold to make a claim, let alone raise a defense to the counterclaim on the basis of 
waiver. The Court clearly erred in its' 2005 ruling. R. 1207, 8175. Add. D, PL Add. A . 
V. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN GRANTING RELIEF ABOVE 
AND BEYOND THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR BY PLAINTIFFS. 
Plaintiffs only request in their January 28, 2005 Motion To Alter Or Amend 
Memorandum Decision Or For New Trial was as follows: 
"Plaintiffs, therefore, request that the Court issue an order amending its 
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Memorandum Decision which can be clarified to reflect that plaintiffs 
have never stipulated to owing the defendant trusts any amount or, 
alternatively, for a new trial on this issue..." R. 7362-7356 Add. J. 
Plaintiffs requested, "...to amend the Court's findings in its January 11,2005 
Memorandum Decision or for a new trial..." R.7362-7256. Add. J. However, the Court 
acted beyond the scope of Plaintiffs' request and granted a new hearing wherein Plaintiffs 
were allowed to bring up issues not prayed for from the September 22, 2004 hearing. 
To appeal for a rehearing on a matter, the party must follow the requirements 
outlined in URCP Rule 59(a) and Rule 59(b) which are listed in Addendum. 
While Plaintiffs cite "(a)(6)Insufficiency of the evidence" they do not indicate what 
the insufficiency was, nor do they offer any proof. In this case, there was no new evidence 
and there was no new law. Without new evidence, new facts or new law, there are no 
grounds for reconsideration. Plaintiffs provided none. Thus, the Court erred in granting 
Plaintiffs relief above and beyond the relief prayed for. 
VI. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN OVERRULING A FINAL 
JUDGMENT ENTERED BY A JUDGE OF CONCURRENT 
AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION. 
The rule of law generally precludes one District Judge of concurrent jurisdiction 
from acting as an Appellate Judge and reversing a ruling from another. See In re Estate of 
Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 (1975), Harward v. Harward, 526 P.2d 1183, Peterson v. Peterson, 
530 P.2d 821. Utah Supreme Court inNelson v. Salt Lake City School Board, 645 P.2d 658: 
"This Court has ruled that one district court judge may not overrule the 
ruling of another district court judge..." 
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Judge Stott was the trier of fact for virtually all of this case. He was fully aware of 
the circumstances and events encompassing this case. He made numerous rulings in regard 
to the ownership of the property, the application of the statute of limitations, and various 
motions in limine which had been filed in this matter. Indeed, Judge Stott ruled that 
Plaintiffs were precluded from making any claim of right to the rent. He also stated that the 
Allred Trusts were the owners of the Provo property and were thus entitled to the rent 
proceeds therefrom. R.6616-6618. Addendum L. The newly rotated judge appeared to act 
without full cognizance of the record in overruling Judge Stott's final order, and thus erred. 
CONCLUSION 
While reasonable men may differ, it does not seem reasonable to have multiple 
judges entering different rulings, particularly in light of the fact that Judge Schofield was 
not the judge who heard most of the motions, particularly the motions in limine, saw the 
evidence during trial, and listened to the arguments of counsel. Judge Stott had formulated 
rulings as to the conduct of the trial, the nature of the evidence presented, and the rulings in 
regard to the motions in limine. 
But most fatal of all is the fact that there had been no new facts and/or law presented 
by Plaintiffs to satisfy the provisions of URCP 59(a). With no reason presented to justify a 
new hearing, there was no provision which would allow Judge Schofield to overrule a judge 
of concurrent jurisdiction. Due to Court error, Judge Schofield's ruling should be vacated 
and Judge Stott's ruling should be reinstated, since Judge Stott, acting as trier of fact, was 
clearly the most qualified to render the ruling in this particular matter. 
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CROSS APPEAL OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 
CONSOLIDATED CASE 
CONSOLIDATED CASE STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final "Summary Judgment in a Civil Case". This case was 
consolidated with the primary case in this matter due to the closely related issues and 
content. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err in granting summary judgment for the Plaintiffs and 
ordering the release of the Notice of Action Pending and granting attorney fees to Plaintiffs? 
This issue was preserved at R 7956-7957. "Thus, summary judgment only involves legal 
conclusions, which we review for correctness, according no deference to the trial court." 
Martin v. Kearl, 917 P.2d 91, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
For Full Text of Statutes and Rules Refer to Addendum A 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 7(f)(1) Orders. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-40-2 Lis Pendens. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-40-2.5 Motions related to a notice 
of the pendency of an action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a cross appeal from a Summary Judgment entered by the Fourth District 
Court, in regard to a case originally filed in Second District Court and transferred to Utah 
County. All of the parties had not appeared in this matter, when the Court rendered 
summary judgment, ordering the removal of a Notice of Action Pending filed in Davis 
County, and granting Plaintiffs' attorney fees in the amount of $8058.00. The issues on 
appeal are in regard to the efficacy of granting attorney fees, whether or not such Notice of 
Action Pending was a lis pendens, or an attempt to collect a judgment for money. 
On September 22, 2004, in the underlying case of this matter, Judge Stott issued a 
ruling and judgment in favor of Defendants in the amount of $127,800.00. This amount 
represented the rent proceeds which Plaintiffs wrongfully appropriated from the "Provo 
property" rents. R.6941-6943, 8166 p. 108-111. Addendum G. 
On September 22, 2004, Plaintiffs' counsel was assigned by the Court to prepare an 
order and judgment in regard to the September 22, 2004 hearing. R.6941-6943 Add. G. 
On November 19, 2004, Plaintiffs' counsel prepared said judgment and order and 
mailed it to Defendants. Plaintiffs did not send the proposed order to the Court. Addendum I 
In late December 2004, a "FOR SALE" sign appeared on the house of the Plaintiff in 
Bountiful, Utah. Defendants filed a "Notice Of Action Pending" on December 30, 2004, to 
prevent Plaintiff from disposing of the property and being unable to satisfy the September 
22, 2004 judgment. Rule 7(f)(2) states: 
Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party 
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other 
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections 
to the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party 
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an 
objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
The only variation from this Rule was that Plaintiffs' counsel was ordered to prepare 
and file the order. Plaintiffs' counsel failed to file the order and judgment they prepared on 
November 19,2004. R.6941-6943. AddendumG. Addendum I. 
Nevertheless, Rule 7(f)(1) states: 
An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order 
entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of 
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money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment.. 
The filing of Defendant's "Notice of Action Pending" was filed in order to collect a 
debt, pursuant to Rule 7(f)(1) and required only an order to begin the collection process. 
Plaintiffs filed an action in Davis County on March 30, 2005 to remove the "Lis Pendens". 
Various motions to strike, including Failure to Join an Indispensable Party, i.e. Inez 
Allred were filed, since Mary Allred Jensen was claiming ownership of the property on 
behalf of the David H. Allred Exemption Trust and the Mary H. Allred Survivors Trust 
which were the Plaintiffs in the Davis County action. Several hearings were held in Davis 
County and the Court determined that the matter should be consolidated in Utah County. 
Meanwhile, Fourth District Court experienced a rotation of judges and a newly 
assigned judge agreed to reconsider Judge Stott's ruling of September 22, 2004. The Court 
eventually concluded that the trustee of the Trusts, Richard Allred, had waived the right to 
receive the rents, and therefore, the previous judgment was set aside. R.7601-7602. 
Upon receipt of the new judgment, the Notice of Action Pending was rescinded. It is 
believed that Plaintiffs sold the house to a third party. R. 7601-7602. Addendum K. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court ruled that the Defendant Trusts were the owners of the Provo property 
and were entitled to the rent proceeds. On September 22, 2004 a judgment was rendered 
giving Defendants a judgment in the amount of $127,800.00 against Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs' counsel was assigned by the Court to prepare the order and judgment and 
did so on November 19, 2004, sending a copy to the Defendants. Plaintiffs failed to ever 
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send a copy to the Court for filing. Plaintiffs then used this to their advantage in filing a 
Motion to Alter or Amend Memorandum Decision or for New Trial on January 28, 2005. 
R. 6941-6943. Addendum G. Addendum I. 
Defendants, having no abstract to file with the Davis County Recorder, learned that a 
"For Sale" sign was placed upon Plaintiffs' home in Bountiful, Utah. Defendants filed a 
Notice of Action Pending with the Davis County Recorder. R.7956-7957. Addendum M. 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should not benefit from their own malfeasance, and, 
summary judgment should not have been issued in regard to a lawsuit filed in Davis County, 
which was transferred to Utah County and consolidated with this action. Summary judgment 
was entered, various motions to strike had not been heard, all the parties had not been 
joined, and some of the parties had not as yet answered the Complaint at the time the Court 
issued summary judgment. Attorney fees were awarded to the Plaintiffs. It is argued by 
Defendants that attorney fees were improper and that Rule 7(f)(1) allows the collection of a 
money judgment without the imposition of a final judgment and order. There was during 
this time, a judgment in the amount of $127,800.00 outstanding. Later, a judgment against 
the Plaintiffs was entered for costs in the amount of $4065.49 in favor of the Defendants. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS WERE WELL WITHIN THEIR RIGHTS TO FILE A 
NOTICE OF ACTION PENDING IN THE ABSENCE OF A FILED 
JUDGMENT, PURSUANT TO URCP 7(f)(1), AND BY VIRTUE OF 
THE FACT THAT IT WAS SIMPLY AN EFFORT TO COLLECT THE 
DEBT. 
As stated earlier, Defendants filed a Notice of Action Pending against the Bountiful, 
47 
Utah, property of Plaintiff in an attempt to prevent Plaintiff from disposing of her assets 
and voiding paying the judgment. Plaintiffs' counsel had been assigned to file the final 
judgment resulting from the September 22, 2004 hearing in the underlying case. Because of 
malfeasance on his part, Plaintiffs' counsel failed to file the final order and judgment in a 
timely manner. Defendants thus filed a Notice of Action Pending to preserve their right to 
collect the judgment rendered in Fourth District Court. 
II. THERE WAS A JUDGMENT AWARDED IN FOURTH DISTRICT 
COURT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$127,800.00 AT THE TIME THE NOTICE OF ACTION PENDING 
WAS FILED. LATER, THE COURT WOULD ALSO ENTER A 
JUDGMENT FOR COSTS OF COURT FOR DEFENDANTS. 
At the time Defendants filed their Notice of Action Pending in Davis County, there 
was an order and judgment in their favor in Fourth District Court in the amount of 
$127,800.00. Plaintiffs were aware of this judgment, since they had been ordered by the 
Court to prepare the order and judgment and file it with the Court at the conclusion of the 
September 22, 2004 hearing. R. 6941-6943. Addendum G. 
At the time Plaintiffs filed their Complaint in this matter on March 17, 2005, they 
still had not complied with the order of the Court in filing the final order and judgment from 
the September 22, 2004 hearing. Why had Plaintiffs delayed filing the judgment? Add. I. 
Later, to add to the judgment amount of $127,800.00, the Court would also award 
Defendants the sum of $4,065.49 as costs of court as the prevailing party. 
III. THE TRANSFER OF THE BOUNTIFUL HOUSE WAS A SHAM AND 
A VIOLATION OF THE UTAH UNIFORM FRAUDULENT 
TRANSFER ACT. 
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Plaintiffs claim that on June 8, 2001, Plaintiffs' Bountiful house was transferred to 
the David H. and Mary H. Allred Trust. Subsequently, on January 17, 2003, Mary A. 
Jensen, newly appointed trustee for the David H. and Mary H. Allred Trust, transferred an 
undivided one half interest each to David H. Allred Exemption Trust and the Mary H. 
Allred Survivors Trust, Mary Allred Jensen, trustee and sole beneficiary. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, such transfers were not known to Defendants, and 
Mary Allred Jensen, at her deposition, denied taking any actions on behalf of her parents or 
any of their trusts. R. 8056 p. 31. Addendum N. 
Such transfers were made in violation of the Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, 
UCA 25-6-1 through 25-6-14, which prohibits the transferring of property to avoid 
creditors. The Allred Trusts were a creditor of Inez H. Allred at that time. 
The transfer of the Bountiful house property was a sham, since Inez H. Allred 
continued to live in the house as she had done since 1957. No action had been taken to fund 
the Bountiful house trust or to have this trust make the payment of bills relative to the 
property. Property tax notices were still sent to David and Inez Allred. The taxes on the 
property and the utility bills were still in the name of David and Inez Allred and were 
certainly not in the name of a trust, although the Complaint alleged the property was 
transferred in June 2001. Even though Plaintiffs claim that the trust was executed earlier, 
no action in terms of establishing or ratifying the trusts or in any way activating the trusts 
had been made, and still has not been made. Inez Allred continued to live in the home until 
approximately fall or winter 2005. 
49 
IV. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES TO THE 
PLAINTIFFS 
Defendants contend that the Court erred in awarding attorney fees to the Plaintiffs 
pursuant to the UCA Lis Pendens statute Section 78-40-2.5. 
Section 78-40-2 UCA relates to a lis pendens, and is filed when there is an action 
affecting the title to or the right of possession of real property. 
This Notice of Action Pending was not a lis pendens, but was simply a Notice of 
Action Pending in the pursuance of the collection of a debt, pursuant to Rule 7(f)(1) which 
states: "...an order for the payment of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it 
were a judgment." There was no requirement that the final judgment be signed and entered 
by the Court, only that "an order for the payment of money" be awarded by the Court. In 
this case, there was a judgment in the amount of $127,800.00. R.6941-6943 Addendum G. 
Defendants were well within their rights to file a Notice of Action Pending since 
Plaintiffs had failed and refused to prepare and submit the proposed order and judgment 
pursuant to the order of Judge Stott on September 22, 2004. Although the order and 
judgment was prepared, Plaintiffs never sent it to the Court. R. 6941-6943 Add. G and I. 
Although the statute requires the awarding of attorney fees in lis pendens cases, this 
was not a lis pendens. It was merely an attempt to collect a judgment. It should be noted, 
however, that Plaintiffs filed a lis pendens against the Provo property at the time they filed 
the lawsuit in Fourth District Court, on February 15, 2001 and failed and refused to remove 
the lis pendens until the Court ordered it in October 2005. No attorney fees were awarded 
to Defendants, even though they were forced to bring the motion against Plaintiffs for the 
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removal of the lis pendens in Utah County. R. 7210-7211,7223, 7224, 7227. Addendum Q. 
Plaintiffs knew at all times there was an order, ruling and judgment against them 
from the Fourth District Court in favor of Defendants, either for the sum of $127,800.00 in 
wrongly appropriated rent proceeds or for $4,065.49 in costs as determined by the Court. 
Therefore, the award of attorney fees to Plaintiffs in this case was improper, and 
incorrect. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants were well within their rights when they filed a Notice of Action Pending 
pursuant to URCP Rule 7(f)(1) since Plaintiffs inaction had deprived them of an abstract of 
judgment. Plaintiffs were well aware at the time they filed their action in Davis County that 
an order had been issued and they were also aware that they had prepared a judgment and 
order and had failed to submit it to the Court for execution, pursuant to URCP Rule 7. 
Such Davis County action was wrongly filed by Plaintiffs. Such actions by the 
Fourth Judicial District Court were incorrect in granting summary judgment prior to all of 
the parties having appeared, and in light of the fact that a judgment was in place with the 
Fourth Judicial District Court at the time Plaintiffs filed their action in Davis County. 
Additionally, it was Plaintiffs' own malfeasance that prevented the order and 
judgment rendered on September 22, 2004 from being securely on file with the Fourth 
District Court long before Plaintiffs filed their Davis County action. 
The ruling of the Fourth Judicial District Court in granting Plaintiffs' summary 
judgment and awarding attorney fees was improper and should be reversed. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants, Appellees and Cross Appellants herein, pray for relief 
as follows: 
1. That the Findings of Fact and judgment rendered by the Fourth District Court 
that the Allred Trusts own the Provo property and are entitled to the rents 
therefrom be affirmed. 
2. That the original judgment entered by the Honorable Gary D. Stott on 
September 22, 2004 be reinstated. 
3. That the ruling granting Plaintiffs summary judgment and attorney fees in the 
consolidated case be reversed. 
DATED this 5th day of March, 2007. 
A CHARD G. ALLRED Attorney for Appellees and Cross Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that two true and correct copies of the foregoing SUPREME 
COURT BRIEF OF APPELLEES AND CROSS APPELLANTS were hand delivered 
on the 5th day of March, 2007, to the following counsel of record: 
Mr. Michael R. Carlston 
Mr. Kenneth L. Reich 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
ADDENDUM 
A. Relevant Statutes and Rules 
B. 1982 and 1983 Quitclaim Deeds and The Allred Trusts 
C. 1978 and 1979 Warranty Deeds and Whitney Trusts 
D. Transcript of January 23, 2004 Hearing 
E. Plaintiffs' Memorandum for Adverse Possession 
F. Telephone Company Lease — Article XIV 
G. Minute Order and Transcript of September 22, 2004 Hearing 
H. Memorandum to Our Executrix Mary Allred Jensen Bates 0771 
I. Plaintiffs' Letter and Proposed September 22, 2004 Order 
J. Plaintiffs' Motion of January 28, 2005 and Court Memorandum 
K. Minute Order of July 28, 2005 
L. Minute Order of July 26, 2004 re: Motion in Limine 
M. Notice of Action Pending 
N. Deposition of Mary Allred Jensen 
O. Excerpts from Depositions of Inez Allred 
P. Affidavits, Errata, Request for Admission of Inez Allred 
Q. Defendants' Motion for Removal of Plaintiffs' Lis Pendens 
ADDENDUM A 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-14. Possession of tenant deemed 
possession of landlord. 
When the relation of landlord and tenant has existed between any persons, the 
possession of the tenant is deemed the possession of the landlord until the 
expiration of seven years from the termination of the tenancy, or, where there 
has been no written lease, until the expiration of seven years from the time of 
the last payment of rent, notwithstanding that such tenant may have acquired 
another title, or may have claimed to hold adversely to his landlord; but such 
presumption cannot be made after the periods herein limited. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-25. Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years; 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in 
writing; also on an open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for 
any article charged on a store account; also on an open account for work, labor 
or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the 
foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within-four years after the last 
charge is made or the last payment is received; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of 
Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent (a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in 
specific situations limits the time for action to one year, under Section 25-6-
19; (b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or [c] Subsection 25-6-6(1) 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-26. Within three years. 
An action may be brought within three years:... 
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action 
in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the 
facts constituting the fraud or mistake; 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-12-7. Adverse possession -
Possession presumed in owner. 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the 
person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been 
possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of the 
property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in 
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been held 
and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the 
commencement of the action. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 7(f)(1) Orders 
An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute order 
entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment of 
money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except 
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the 
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or 
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, 
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 7(f)(2) Orders: 
Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party 
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other 
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to 
the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party 
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an 
objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 12(h) Waiver of defenses: 
A party waives all defenses and objections not presented either by motion or 
by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable 
party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also 
be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on 
the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, whenever it 
appears by suggestion of the parties, or otherwise that the court lacks 
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-40-2 Lis Pendens 
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real property 
the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint or thereafter, and the defendant 
at the time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is claimed in such 
answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of the 
county in which the property or some part thereof is situated a notice of the 
pendency of the action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the 
action or defense, and a description of the property in that county affected 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-40-2 Lis Pendens -continued-
thereby. From the time of filing such notice for record only shall a purchaser 
or encumbrance of the property affected thereby be deemed to have 
constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency 
against parties designated by their real names. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 78-40-2.5 Motions related to a notice 
of the pendency of an action 
(1) As used in this section: (a) "Claimant" means a person who filed a notice, 
(b) "Guarantee" means an agreement by a claimant to pay an amount of 
damages: (I) specified by the court; (ii) suffered as a result of the maintenance 
of a notice; (iii) to a person with an interest in the real property that is the 
subject of the notice; and (iv) if the requirements of Subsection (6) are met. 
(d) "Notice means a notice of the pendency of an action filed under Section 
78-40-2. 
(2) Any time after a notice has been recorded pursuant to Section 78-40-2, any 
of the following may make a motion to the court in which the action is 
pending to release the notice; (a) a party to the action; or (b) a person with an 
interest in the real property affected by the notice. 
(3) A court shall order a notice released it: (a) the court receives a motion to 
release under Subsection (2); and (b) the court finds that the claimant has not 
established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the 
real property claim that is the subject of the notice. 
(4) If a court releases a notice pursuant to this section, the claimant may not 
record another notice with respect to the same property without approval of 
the court in which the action is pending. 
(5) Upon a motion by any person with an interest in the real property that is 
the subject of a notice, a court may require the claimant to give the moving 
party a guarantee as a condition of maintaining the notice: (a) any time after a 
notice has been recorded; and (b) regardless of whether a court has received 
an application to release under Subsection (2). 
(6) A person who receives a guarantee under Subsection (5) may recover an 
amount not to exceed the amount of the guarantee upon a showing that (a) the 
claimant did not prevail on the real property claim; and (b) the person seeking 
the guarantee suffered damages as a result of the maintenance of the notice. 
(7) A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party on any 
motion under this section unless the court finds that: (a) the nonprevailing 
party acted with substantial justification; or (b) other circumstances make the 
imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 59(a) Grounds. 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of 
the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; 
provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a 
jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional 
testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings 
and conclusions and direct the entry of a new judgment. 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
(a)(2) Misconduct of the jury... 
(a)(3) Accident or surprise, ordinary prudence could not have guarded against. 
(a)(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, 
which he could not, reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at trial. 
(a)(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or 
that it is against law. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 59(b) Time for motion. 









FOR-VALUE RECEIVED, DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED, thl 
Grantors, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto RICHARD G. 
ALLRED, as trustee for THE RICHARD MARK ALLRED TRUST, THE ROBERT 
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST, THE MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST, THE MICHAEL 
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST, THE STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST, THE KARSN 
ALLRED TRUST, THE NATHAN ALLRED TRUST, and THE MARY LEE ALLRED TRUST, 
and to MARY L£B ALLRED, Trustee of the RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST, ail 
of said trusts being formed through the laws of the State of Utah, 
the Trustees residing in Bountiful, Davis County., State of Utah, 
an undivided fifty-percent interest to be held jointly and equally 
among the foregoing trusts, the following described premises in 
"Prove City, Utah County, State'of Utah, to wit: 
Commencing at a point oft" the North side of 
1325 South Street, Provd, Utah, and the 
Southeast corner of Commercial Tire Company's 
property, which point is,South 289.5 feet and 
East 1,504.71 feet from the Northwest corner • 
of Section 18, Township 7 South, Range 3 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian? thence North 0°5Q' 
East 526.0 feet; thence South 89°I0f East 414.0 
feet; thence South 0°50' West 526.0 feet; thence 
North 89°10' West-414.0 feet to the place of 
beginning, 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances, 
unto the said Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. 
DATED: This 30t-h day of Dece/oer, 1982 
> ^ ^ 
/ID H« ALLRED 
INEZ H./ALLRED~ 
Cisia-J 
s s . 
£3 
I :ATE~OF UTAH ) 
'UNTY OF DAVIS ) 
Subscribed and sworn to on this frtrL <*ay of .kjss^i/pt/^J 
'? £tk t before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, 
rsonally appeared DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED, his wi£e;/^
 {ff" ... 
»wn to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to £h<* ..;••*' '\°, 
hin instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed :t»fee samer^ \*ju 
Commission Expires: t-XA-fS 
ary Public ,<i^> J ^fe*. .:'-' v".* iding at: tk^M^t T^.^-f^;-' NotRes 
'jnnnn'f 
i\G UU1I1 UL» i 
1527 E.^aneyard Dr. 







FOR VALUE RECEIVED, DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED, tf 
Grantors, do hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto RICHARD G. 
ALLRED, as trustee for THE RICHARD MARK ALLRED TRUST, THE ROBERT 
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST, THE MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST, THE MICHAEL 
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST, THE STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST, THE KAREN 
ALLRED TRUST, THE NATHAN ALLRED TRUST, and THE MARY LEE ALLRED TRUST, 
and to MARY LEE ALLRED, Trustee of the RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST, all 
of said trusts being formed through the laws of the State of Utah, 
the Trustees residing in Bountiful, Davis County, State of Utah, 
an undivided fifty-percent interest to be held jointly and equally 
among the foregoing trusts, the following described premises in 
Provo City, Utah County, State of Utah, to wit: 
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(Southeast corner of Commercial Tire Company's 
property, which point is South 289.5 feet and 
East 1,504.71 feet from the Northwest corner 
of Section 18, Township 7 South, Range 3 East, ____ 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian? thence North 0°50' 
East 526.0 feet; thence South 89°10f East 414.0 
feet; thence South 0°50' West 526.0 feet; thence 
North 89°10l West 414.0 feet to the place of 
beginning, 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises, with their appurtenances, 
unto the said Grantees, their heirs and assigns forever. 
DATED: This 3rd day of Jaxyujtry, 19 83 
INEZ \{) ALLRED ' 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
g 




1^3 before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, 
personally appeared DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED, his wife, 
known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the 
within instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
u V — v. r_J ^ KZZ<-^ <-^_y 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 8-/1 91? 
Notary P u b l i c 
Res id ing a t : . t | » » l 4 » l f . , 
5.00002 
EXHIBIT 
TRUST AGREEMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF L ~ ^ ° 
STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED 
TRUST AGREEMENT made this 27th day of December, 1982, between 
David H. Allred and Inez H, Allred, his wife, of 330 North 1300 East, 
City of Bountiful, County of Davis, state of Utah, herein referred to 
as "Trustor" and Richard G. Allred of 1527 East Vineyard Drive City 
of Bountiful, county of Davis, State of Utah, herein referred to as 
"Trustee". Trustor and Trustee recite and declare that: 
1. Trustor is now the owner of the property presently leased 
to Mountain Bell Telephone in Provo, Utah, further described in Exhibit 
*A"attached hereto. 
2. Trustor desires to make provisions for the care and management 
of such property and to provide for the collection of the income 
therefrom and the disposition of both such income and such property 
in the manner herein provided. For the reasons set forth above and 
in consideration of the mutual covenants set forth herein, trustor 
and trustee agree: 
SECTION ONE 
Transfer and Trust 
Trustor, in consideration of acceptance by trustee of the trust 
herein created, hereby conveys, transfers and assigns and delivers to 
trustee its sucessors in trust and assigns, property or a portion of 
property described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part' 
hereof by this reference, which property together with all other property 
that may from time to time be held by trustee hereunder, is herein 
referred to as "Trust Estate". 
SECTION TWO 
Disposition of Principal and Income 
Trustee shall care for and manage the Trust Estate and collect 
the income derived therefrom and, after the payment of all taxes and 
assessments thereon and all charges incident to the management thereof 
administer, apply and dispose of the net income therefrom in the corpus 
thereof, as follows: 
a) All net income benefits and or corpus are to be held in 
trust for the benefit of the beneficiary herein for a period of 
twenty-one years from the date of this instrument, at which time the 
corpus of the trust, all accumulated income from the trust and other 
property is to be distributed to the beneficiaries as follows: 
The corpus and the accumulated income is to be distributed -
to the beneficiary, either in a lump sum or over a period of years as 
determined by the trustee to be most beneficial to the beneficiary. 
SECTION THREE 
General Rules Regarding Disbursements 
In any case in which trustee is authorized in its discretion 
or is directed or both, to pay or distribute income to any beneficiary 
whether a minmr or otherwise, trustee may in its sole discretion, at ' 
any time, apply the full or any part of such inccme to or for the care,* 
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comfort, maintenance, support, education, use or other benefit of such 
beneficiary directly, instead of paying or distributing the same to 
such beneficiary. In case any beneficiary shall be a minor or 
incompetent, trustee shall in its sole discretion, make payment or 
distribution of any property to which such minor or incompetent shall 
be entitled hereunder to the guardian, legal or natural, the committee 
or anyother legal representative wherever appointed, of such minor or 
incompetent or to the person with whom such minor or incompetent shall 
reside and a written receipt of the person or persons to whom any such 
payments or distribution to so made, shall be a full and sufficient 
discharge of trustee therefore, eventhough trustee may be such person 
or one of such persons, 
SECTION FOUR 
Additions to Trust 
Trustor, and any other person, shall have the right at any 
'time to add property acceptable to the trustee to this trust and such 
property, when received and accepted by trustee, shall become part of 
the Trust Estate• 
SECTION FIVE 
Powers of Trustee 
Trustee shall have full right, power and authority, in its sole 
and absolute discretion and without authorization by any court to take 
any action it may deem necessary without the necessity for the posting 
of a bond, as follows: 
a) To retai* indefinitely any property, real, personal or mixed and 
to operate at the risk of the trust estate any property or business 
that shall be transferred to trustee in trust by trustor or by 
trustor's executor, regardless of any lack of diversification, any 
risk, or any aonproductivity. 
b) To sell* convey or otherwise dispose of the whole or any part 
of any property at any time held hereunder at such times, for such 
prices, to such party or parties in such manner, as trustee shall 
deem advisable, 
c) To make such purchases or exchanges at such times, for such 
prices, in such manner upon such other terms and conditions as 
trustee shall deem advisable and to invest and reinvest in such 
securities, mrtages, insurance, insurance on the life of any 
person, lease*, commodities, or other obligations either secured or 
unsecured. 
d) To payirr reserve sufficient funds to pay all expenses of 
management aa£ administration of the trust estate, including 
compensation «f trustee, all or any part of which maY/ i n trustee's 
discretion, ic charged either to income or principal of the Trust 
Estate. 
e) To do tfl acts, to institute all proceedings and to exercise 
all other ricpts, powers, privileges that an absolute owner 5369 
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of the property would otherwise have the right to do, subject always 
to the discharge of trustee's fiduciary obligations. 
SECTION SIX 
Duration of Trustee's Powers 
All of the rights, powers, authorities, privileges and immunities 
given to trustee by this agreement shall continue after termination 
of the trust created hereby until trustee shall have made actual 
distribution of all property held by it hereunder. 
SECTION SEVEN 
Trustee's Bond, Court Approval, and Personal Liability 
No bond, surety or other security shall be required of trustee 
for the faithful performance of its duties hereunder, any law of any 
state or other jurisdiction to the contrary notwithstanding nor shall 
trustee be required to qualify before, be appointed by or in the 
absence of breach of trust, account to any court or to obtain the order 
or approval of any court in the exercise of any power, discretion 
hereunder. Trustee shall not be personally liable on any contract, 
note or other instrument executed by it as trustee hereunder or for 
any indebtedness of the trust estate. 
SECTION EIGHT 
Compensation of Trustee 
The original trustee hereunder, and all successor trustees, 
shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for their services as 
trustees. 
SECTION NINE 
Resignation and Succession of Trustees 
Trustee, or any successor, may resign at any time upon giving 
written notice 30 days before such resignation shall take effect, to 
trustor or after the death of trustor to all adult beneficiaries and 
to a parent or quardian of any minor or incompetent beneficiary who 
may then be receiving or entitled to receive income under this agreement. 
SECTION TEN 
Accounting 
Trustee shall not be required to file annual or other 
accounts in any court but shall render as he sees fit an accounting 
each year to the trustor and or to the beneficiaries. 
SECTION ELEVEN 
Purpose and General Construction of Trust 
The primary purpose and intent of trustor in creating the trust 
under this agreement is to benefit the primary beneficiary which has 
been named previously. The foregoing shall not, however, be deemed 
to limit the discretion hereby conferred upon trustee. 
SECTION TWELVE 
Spendthrift Provision 
No title or interest in the ^oney or other property constituting 
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the principal of the Trust Estate, or in any other income accruing 
therefrom or thereon shall vest in any beneficiary during the 
continuance of the trust created hereby. All payments authorized 
and provided to be made by trustee shall be made and shall be valid 
and effectual only when paid to the beneficiary to whom the same 
shall belong *>r otherwise, as herein provided. 
SECTION THIRTEEN 
Perpetuities Saving Clause 
Any otl-^ r term or provision of this agreement to the contrary 
not^it^st^ndiM > *^e trust created hereby shall not continue beyond < 
but shall terminate twenty-one years after the death of the last 
survivor of trustor, trustor's present spouse, and any beneficiary 
named herein #nd living on the date of this agreement-
SECTION FOURTEEN 
Revocation and Amendment 
This t:fust shall be irrevocable and shall not be altered, 
amended, revoKed or terminated by trustor or any other person. 
Trustor herebV declares that his purpose in establishing the trust 
is to provide for the housing, material comforts of the beneficiaries 
during their lives and by this agreement trustor relinquishes 
absolutely and forever all his possession or enjoyment of, or right 
to the income from, the Trust Estate, and all his right and power 
whether alone or in conjunction with others to designate the persons 
who shall possess or enjoy the Trust Estate of the income therefrom. 
Trustor hereby renounces for himself and his estate any interest, 
either vested or contingent including any reversionary right or 
possibility or reverting the principal and income of the trust. 
DATED: This 27th day of December, 1982. 
DAVJ/D H. ALLRED, Trustor 
COUNTY OF DAVI5 ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
On the .$d d a y o f ktr*o*.h.jJ tf<?£ > DAVID H. ALLRED and 
INEZ H. ALLRED, his wife, affixed their signatures as Trustors 
to the above entitled document, in my presence. 
My Commission Expires; 
NOTARY PUBLIC « W / ^>// 
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COUNT. .-..; a iea 
QLPuT:f 
WARRANTY DEED 
DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED, husband and wife 
grantor 
of Sa l t Lake City , County of Sa l t Lake Stete of Utah, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to TERRY WHITNEY, as to an undivided 12.5/* i n t e r e s t , 
SYLVIA AMELIA ALLRED WHITNEY, as to an undivided 12.5% i n t e r e s t , SYLVIA AMELIA ALLRED 
WHITNEY Trustee for the WILLIAM JESSE WHITNEY T r u s t , as t o an undivided 12.5% i n t e r e s t , 
and SYLVIA AMELIA ALLRED WHITENY, Trustee for the SHAUNELL WHITNEY T r u s t , as to an 
undivided 12.5% i n t e r e s t . 
grantee 
of P o c a t e l l o , S t a t e of Idaho for the sum of 
TEN AND No/ioo ^^EEsissrisrvii^irsSiasiHoS—-COLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Cache County, 
State of Utah: 
PARCEL 2: Lot 6 and the North 1/10 of Lot 7, Block 1 3 , P l a t "C" Logan Hay land 
Survey, and fu r the r descr ibed as fol lows: Commencing a t the Northeas t corner 
of sa id Lot 6,and running thence South along the e a s t s ide of sa id Block 44 r o d s ; 
thence West 40 rods ; thence North 44 rods to the Northwest corner of Lot 6 of 
s a id Block; thence East 40 rods to the place of beg inn ing , conta in ing 11 acres 
and s i t u a t e in the Northeast qua r t e r of Section 29, Township 12 North of Range 1 
East of the S a l t Lake Meridian. 
Subject to easements , r e s t r i c t i o n s and r i g h t s of way appear ing of record 
or enforceable in law and e q u i t y .
 A . 
WITNESS, the hand s of said grantors , this 19 th 
October » A. D, 19 78 
Signed in the Presence of 
day of 
DAVID H. ALLRED 
'*'*q M-
, f / I  . 
INEZ H. ALLRED 
STATE OP UTAH, 
County of S a l t Lake 
On. the 19 th day of 
personally appejared before me 
ss. 
October 
DAVIg^ JULt^D.and INEZ H. ALLRED, husband and wife 
0036 
, A. D. 19 7 8 




My commission expires January 20, 19 8fcaai«HJTig \n S a l t Lake C i ty , Utah 
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DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED, husband and wife 
grantor 
of Salt Lake City , County of Salt Lake , State of Utah, hereby 
CONVEY and WARRANT to TERRY WHITNEY, as to an undivided 12.5% i n t e r e s t , 
SYLVIA AMELIA ALLRED WHITNEY, as to an undivided 12.5% i n t e r e s t , SYLVIA AMELIA ALLREI 
WHITNEY Trustee for the WILLIAM JESSE WHITNEY Trust, as to an undivided 12.5% inter* 
and SYLVIA AMELIA ALLRED WHITENY, Trustee for the SHAUNELL WHITNEY Trust, as to an 
undivided 12.5% i n t e r e s t . 
grantee 
of Pocate l lo , State of Idaho for the sum of 
TEN AND NO/100 i H r o T h i r l S o T a " n T v a l ^ ^ 
the following described tract of land in Cache County, 
State of Utah: 
PARCEL 2: Lot 6 and the North 1/10 of Lot 7, Block 13, Plat "C" Logan Hayland 
'Survey, and further described as fol lows: Commencing at the Northeast corner 
of said Lot 6,and running thence South along the east s ide of said Block 44 rods; 
thence West 40 rods; thence North 44 rods to the Northwest corner of Lot 6 of 
' said Block; thence East 40 rods to the place of beginning, containing 11 acres 
and s i t u a t e in the Northeast quarter of Section 29, Township 12 North of Range 1 
East of the Salt Lake Meridian. 
Subject Co easements, re s tr i c t ions and r ights of way appearing of record 
or enforceable in law and equity. 
Of- 1^0 - 000/ 
EXHIBIT 
WITNESS, the hand s of said grantors , this 2nd 
January , A. D. 19 79 
Signed in the Presence of 
day of 
STATE OF UTAH, 
County of Salt Lake 




On the 2nd day of January 
personally appeared before me 
?.., / \ 
'DAVID HV.ALtKED and INEZ H. ALLRED, husband and wife 
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, A . D. 19 79 
. the .s igners of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to m e tha t l he v executed the 
Notary Public. (/ ^ 
My commission expires January 2 0 , 19 8frpai,Kng j n S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah • 
FXHTRTT K Utah Title and Abstract Cnittnan* 
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I EXHIBIT I 
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TRUST AGREEMENT made December 19th, 1979, between 
David H. Allred of 330 North 13th East, Bountiful, County of Davis, 
State of Utah, herein referred to as " t rus tor , lf and 
Sylvia Amelia Allred Whitney of Route 1, 2427 West Lacey Road, 
Pocatello, State of Idaho, herein referred to as " t rus tee . ,f 
Trus tor and Trustee recite and declare that: 
1, Trus tor is now the owner of the property described as 
11 Acres of Commercial Property at 1400 West and 1000 North, in 
Logan, Cache County, State of Utah, and further described in Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto. 
Trus tor desires to make provisions for the c a r e and management 
of such property and to provide for the collection of the income therefrom 
and the disposition of both such income and such proper ty in the manner 
herein provided. 
For the reasons set forth above and in consideration of the mutual 
covenants set forth herein trustor and t rus tee agree: 
SECTION ONE 
Transfer and Trus t 
Trus tor , in consideration of acceptance by t rus tee of the trust 
herein created hereby conveys, t ransfers , assigns and delivers to t rustee 
its successors in trust and assigns, property or a portion of property 
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a par t hereof by this 
reference, which property, together with all other property that may from 
time to t ime be held by trustee hereunder, is herein re fe r red to as "Trust 
Estate. I f 
SECTION TWO 0059 
Disposition of Principal and Income 
Trustee shall care for and manage the Trus t Estate and 
collect the income derived therefrom and, after the payment of all 
taxes and assessments thereon and all charges incident to the 
TRUST AGREEMENT 
FOR THE BENEFIT OF 
TRUST AGREEMENT made >be^ . I , 1978 between David H. 
Allrcd of ' itrcot. «s C U y , Oou * - of 
, State of I'cah, herein referred to as "trustor" 
a n a n „ , ., • -. < of Route 1 2427 West Lacey 
Road, Pocatello, State of Idaho, herein referred to as "trustee". 
Trustor and trustee recite and declare that: 
1. Trustor is now the owner of the property described as 
11 Acres* of Commercial Property at 1400 West and 1000 North, ia 
Logan, Utah, and further described in Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto. 
2. Trustor desires to make provisions for the care and 
management of such property and to provide for the collection 
of the income therefrom and the disposition of both such 
income and such property in the manner herein provided. 
For the reasons set forth above and in consideration of the 
mutual covenants set forth herein trustor and trustee agree: 
SECTION ONE 
Transfer and Trust 
Trustor, in consideration of acceptance by trustee of the 
trust herein created hereby conveys, transfers, assigns and 
delivers to trustee its sucessors in trust and assigns, property 
or a portion of property described in exhibit "A" attached hereto 
and made apart hereof by this reference, which property together 
with all other property that may from time to time be held by 
trustee hereunder, is herein referred to as "Trust Estate". 
SECTION TWO 
Disposition of Principal and Income 
Trustee shall care for and manage the Trust Estate and 
collect the income derived therefrom and, after the payment of 
all taxes and assessments thereon and all charges incident to the 
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management thereof, admister, apply and dispose of the net 
income therefrom in the corpus thereof, as follows: 
a) All net income benefits and or corpus are to be held in 
trust for the benefit of the beneficiary 
until such time as the said beneficiary reaches the age of 
twenty-one years at which time the corpus of the trust all 
accumulated income from the trrust and other property is to be 
distributed to the beneficiary as follows: 
One-fifth to be distributed each year for a period of 
five years from the time of the beneficiary's twenty-first 
birthday. 
SECTION THREE 
General Rules Regarding Disbursements 
In any case in which trustee is authorized in its discretion 
or is directed, or both, to pay or distribute income to any 
beneficiary, whether a minor or otherwise, trustee may in its 
sole discretion, at any time, apply the full or any part of such 
income to or for the care, comfort, maintenance, support, education, 
use or other benefit of such beneficiary directly, instead of 
paying or distributing the same to such beneficiary, 
b) In case any beneificary shall be a minor or incompetent, 
trustee may, in its sole discretion, make payment or distribution 
or any property to which such minor or incompetent shall be entitled 
hereunder to the guardian, legal or natural, the committee, or any 
other legal representative, wherever appointed, of such minor or 
incompetent or to the person with whom such minor or incompetent ah^l 
reside, and the written receipt of the person or persons to whom 
any such payments or distribution is so made, shall be a full and 
..sufficient discharge of trustee therefor even though trustee may be 
such person or one of such persons, 
SECTION FOUR 
Additions to Trust 
Trustor, and any other person, shall have the right at any time 
to add property acceptable to the trustee to this trust and such 
property, when received and accepted by trustee, shall become part 




Powers of Trustee 
Trustee shall have full right, power, and authority, in its 
sole and absolute discretion and without authorization by any court 
to take any action it may deem necessary without the necessity 
for the posting of a bond, as follows: 
a) To retain indefinitely any property, real, personal or mixed 
and to operate at the risk of the trust estate any property or 
business that shall be transferred to trustee in trust by trustor 
or by trustor*s executor, regardless of any lack of diversification, 
any risk, or any nonproductivity. 
b) To sell, convey or otherwise dispose of the whole or any 
part of any property at any time held hereunder at such' times, 
for such prices, to such party or parties in such manner, as 
trustee shall deem advisable. 
c) To make such purchases or- exchanges at such times, for such 
prices, in such manner upon such other terras and conditions as 
trustee shall deem advisable and to invest and reinvest in such 
securities, mortages, insurance, insurance on the life on any 
person, leases, commodities, or other obligations either secured or 
unsecured, 
d) To pay or reserve sufficient funds to pay all expenses of 
management and administration of the trust estate, including 
compensation of trustee, all or any part of which may, in trustee's 
discretion, be charged either to income or principal of the trust 
estate. 
e) To to all acts, to institute all proceedings and to 
exercise all other rights, powers, privileges that an absolute 
owner of the property would otherwise have the right to do, subject 
alwavs to the discharcre of trustee's fiduciary obligations. 
SECTION SIX 
Duration of Trustee's Powers 
M l of the rights, powers, authorities, privileges and immunities 
given to trustee by this agreement shall continue after termination 
2631 
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of the trust created hereby until trustee shall have made 
actual distribution of all property held by it hereunder. 
SECTION SEVEN 
Trustee's Bond, Court Approval, and Personal Liability 
No bond, surety or other security shall be required of 
trustee for the faithful performance of its duties hereunder, any 
law of any state or other 3urisdiction to the contrary notwithstandir 
nor shall trustee be required to qualify before, be appointed by 
or in the absence of breach of trust, account to any court or to 
obtain the order or approval of any court m the exercise of any 
power, discretion hereunder. Trustee shall not be personally 
liable on any contract, note or other instrument executed by 
it as trustee hereunder or for any indebtness of the trust estate. 
SECTION EIGHT 
Compensation of Trustee 
The original trustee hereunder, and all successor trustees, 
shall be entitled to reasonable compensation ^ for their services 
as trustee. 
SECTION NINE 
Resignation and Succession of Trustees 
a) Trustee, or any successor, may resign at any time upon 
giving written notice 30 days before such resignation shall take 
effect, to trustor or after the death of trustor to all adult 
beneficiaries and to a parent or guardian of any minor or incompetent 
beneficiary who may then be receiving or entitled to receive income 
under this agreement. 
SECTION TEN 
Accounting 
Trustee shall not be required to file annual or other accounts in 
any court but shall render as he sees fit an accounting each year to 
the trustor and or to the beneficiaries. 
SECTION ELEVEN 
Purpose and General Construction of Trust 
The primary purpose and intent of trustor in creating the trust 
?67 3 
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under this agreement it to benefit the primary beneficiary 
which has been named previously. The foregoing shall not, however, 
be deemed to limit the discretion hereby conferred upon trustee. 
SECTION TWELVE 
Spendthrift Provision 
No title or interest in the money or other property constituting 
the principal of the trust estate, or in any other income accruing 
therefrom or thereon shall vest in any beneficiary during the 
continuance of the trust created hereby. All payments authorized 
and provided to be made by trustee shall be made and shall be valid 
and effectual only when paid to the beneficiary to whom the same 
shall belong, or otherwise, as herein provided. 
SECTION THIRTEEN 
Perpetuities Saving Clause 
Any other term or privision of this agreement to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the trust created hereby shall not continue 
beyond, but shall terminate twenty-one years after the death 
of the last survivor of trustor, trustor's present spouse, and 
any beneficiary named herein and living on the date of this agreement. 
SECTION FOURTEEN 
Revocation and Amendment 
This trust shall be irrevocable and shall not be altered, 
amended, revoked or terminated by trustor or any other person. 
Trustor hereby declares that his purpose in establishing the trust 
is to provide for the housing, material comforts of the beneficiaries 
during their lives and by this agreement trustor relinquishes 
absolutely and forever all his possession or enjoyment of, or right 
to the income from, the trust estate, and all his right and power 
whether alone or in conjunction with others to designate the persons 
who shall possess or enjoy the trust estate or the income therefrom. 
Trustor hereby renounces for himself and his estate any interest, 
either vested or contingent including any reversionary right or 
possibility or reverting the principal and income of the trust. 
0041 
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SYLVIA AMEIIA ALLRED WHITNEY, Trustee 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
:ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
0 n the personally appeared before 
me DAVjo
 H < ALLRED, Trustor, and SYLVIA AMELIA ALLRFD WHITNEY, 
Trustee, the signers of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that they executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
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Judge Gary D. Stott 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on January 23, 2004. 
WHEREUPON, the parties represented through by counsel, 
the following proceedings were held: 
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Sixth, reference with respect to beneficial, 
plaintiffs making reference to beneficial holding of the 
Provo property. I'm not going to limit people as to how 
they want to argue or phrase how they're entitled to claim 
the property. That's something that you can talk to a jury 
about. If, if the plaintiffs want, want to claim that 
they're holding beneficial title to the property the 
defendants can argue about that. That's something that's a 
matter to be addressed to a jury. I don't have to exclude 
that type of reference or, or characterization the parties 
want to use concerning the Provo property. So I'm denying 
that. 
Seventh, preclude any claims that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to rent from the Provo property. Nobody 
mentioned anything with respect to Judge Schofield's 
ruling. Judge Schofield's ruling was pretty clear. His 
ruling said what it said. And a, as to that narrow issue his 
ruling said the following: 
The documents provided by Richard 
Allred demonstrate that the property 
leased by Qwest is owned by the trust, 
David and Inez Allred having conveyed it 
to the trust in 1982. Though plaintiffs 
assert that they have a colorable title 




























on the face of the documents pertaining 
to the properties, the parties, the 
property is owned by the trusts and the 
lease rent should be paid to the trusts. 
So any claims that, that they were entitled to the, 
to the monies, entitled to the rent, Schofield's, Schofield's 
ruling stands. 
Eight, precluding any reference to the Qwest 
corporation being the plaintiff's tenants after the deeds 
were executed in '82 and '83. I'm going to deny that. 
That's a matter of argument that the parties can make to the 
jury as to the, as to the respective positions of, of the 
parties. 
Number nine, expert testimony of David Holmberg. 
I'm going to grant it. I'm going to exclude his testimony. 
It's a fact issue for the jury. You put in the information, 
they don't, the jury doesn't need Mr. Holmberg's testimony. 
That's granted. 
Number 10, expert testimony of Charles Huber. 
That's granted as well. To give expert testimony as to the 
ownership of the Provo property based upon tax documents, 
things of that nature, that's excluded. A proper 
instruction will be given to the jury, they'll hear the 





MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577) 
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578) 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and 
through MARY A. JENSEN, Personal 
Representative for the ESTATE OF 
DAVID H. ALLRED, and INEZ H. 
ALLRED, 
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. No. 010400765 
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and 
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK 
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT 
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE 
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST; 
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER 
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN 
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED 
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee 
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST, 
and QWEST CORPORATION, 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Defendants. 
INTRODUCTION 
Among the essential facts set forth in Plaintiffs' complaint are that Richard G. Allred, 
attorney, tax preparer and advisor to his parents persuaded them that they should transfer their 
Provo Property to "save taxes." Deeds were recorded based upon his advice and relying upon his 
assurances that the transfer was only for tax purposes and did not actually transfer ownership. It 
was never intended or agreed that ownership be transferred as conclusively demonstrated by the 
subsequent conduct of the parties. After the deeds were recorded nothing changed. The parents 
continued to receive the rents. The parents continued to control the Provo Property and 
continued to be recognized as the Owner for all purposes by the Tenants. The parents paid the 
taxes on the Provo Property and filed tax returns prepared by Richard G. Allred showing the 
income from the Provo Property as their income. The parents negotiated changes in extensions 
of the Lease on the Provo Property and did all of these things with the full knowledge of Richard 
G. Allred and Mary Lee Allred, the putative Trustees of the Allred Trusts. 
When the aging parents wished to convey the Provo Property to their church in 1992. 
The putative trustees did not cooperate in such transfer, but also did not interfere in any way with 
the parents continuing exercise of all ownership rights to the Provo Property. In June of 2000, 
possibly assuming that the impasse that they had created had existed for long enough so that the 
rights of the parents to take action were compromised, Richard G. Allred and Mary Lee Allred 
persuaded the tenant that despite the fact that the Allred Trusts had made no claim nor asserted 
any ownership rights to the Provo Property in the eighteen years following the recordation of the 
deeds, that the Allred Trusts should nonetheless be recognized as the owner by the tenant. The 
-2-
tmant agreed to do so, but only upon receiving the signed acknowledgment of the Allred Trusts 
through the putative trustees that " . . . notice of such conveyances [the quitclaim deeds] was not 
provided Tenant prior to this third amendment [dated June 19, 2000] and Tenant has continued to 
enter into lease agreements with the original owners David H. Allred and Inez H. Allred." Not 
only did the putative trustees acknowledge this, but then agreed that among the essential 
purposes of this third amendment was "to clarify ownership to the premises, as well as confirm 
and ratify all previous amendments, the parties enter into the third amendment." Exhibit 10 
Amendment [^2. 
Each of the counts in Plaintiffs' complaint can and will be proved as necessary. 
Plaintiffs, however, are now entitled to summary judgment that Plaintiffs are the lawful owners 
of title to the Provo Property by adverse possession. For purposes of this motion only, it is 
accepted that the 1982-1983 quitclaim deeds are construed to be effective to convey title to the 
Allred Trusts. Despite this construction which is construed in the light most favorable to the 
party against whom summary judgment is sought, the subsequent activities following the 
recordation of the 1982-1983 deeds demonstrates that the Plaintiffs have obtained title by 
adverse possession. 
Under U.R.C.P. 56, a party may obtain summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 
law. When a motion for summary judgment is made, a defendant may not simply rely on 
allegations or denials in pleadings, but is required to set forth specific material facts showing 
there is a genuine issue for trial. Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979). Mere speculation 
-3-
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ADDENDUM F 
Owner '.vhether or not it will purchase the property within thirty 
(30) days after the mailing of notice as aforesaid, then, at 
any time thereafter, without further notice, Owner may sell 
the premises to any person for not less than the purchase price 
and upon terns no more favorable to the purchaser than those 
set forth in the offer communicated to Tenant; provided, how-
ever, that such sale shall be subject to all terms and condi-
tions of* this Lease including all provisions of this Article XII. 
ARTICLE XIII 
Notices 
Any notice desired or required to be given by one party 
hereto to the other party hereto shall be given in writing, 
mailed by registered mail, return receipt requested, postage 
prepaid to the applicable address specified below: 
Address of Owner: David U. Allred 
330 North 1300 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Address of Tenant: Utah Chief Engineer 
Mountain Bell 
80 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
or such other address as either party shall give notice of 
in writing to the other party, at any time or from timo to 
time, 
ARTICLE XIV 
Successors and Assigns 
The terms, conditions and provisions of this lease shall 
inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the respective 
parties hereto, the personal representatives, executors and 
administrators of the Owner, and the successors and assigns 





THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into as of the 26th 
day of August, 1973 , by and between David H. Allred and 
Inez H. Allred , hereinafter, 
whether one or more, jointly and severally called "Owner," 
and THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, a 
Colorado corporation, hereinafter called "Tenant," WITNESSETH: 
That for and in consideration of the covenants and pro-
mises hereinafter contained, Owner and Tenant do hereby mutually 
agree as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
Property Leased 
The Owner hereby demises, lets and leases unto the Tenant, 
and the Tenant hereby hires, rents and takes from the Owner 
for the term hereinafter specified all of that certain parcel 
of land and improvements thereon, situate, lying and being 
in the bounty of ut*h, State of Ptah, particularly described 
a? follows: 
Commencing at a point on the North side of 
1325 South Street, Provo, Utah, and the 
Southeast corner of Commercial Tire Company's 
property, which point is South 289,5 feet 
and East 1,504.71 feet from the Northwest 
corner of Section 18, Township 7 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
thence North 0o50l East 526,0 feet; thence 
South 89°10' East 414.0 feet; thence South 
0°50f West 526.0 feet; thence North 89o10f 
West 414.0 feet to the place of beginning. 
ARTICLE II 
Construction of Building 
The Owner covenants and agrees, immediately upon the 
execution of this lease, to proceed at Owner's sole cost and 
expense, to construct and erect a building, identified as 
0011 
ADDENDUM G 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
INEZ H. ALLRED Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Case No: 010400765 DC 
Judge: GARY D STOTT 
Date: September 22, 2004 
Clerk: marilynn 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff(s): INEZ H. ALLRED 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): MICHAEL R. CARLSTON 
CORY D MEMMOTT 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD G ALLRED 
Other Parties: MARY LEE ALLRED 
Audio 
Tape Number: GDS37CD Tape Count: 8:40 
HEARING 
COUNT: 8:40 
This matter comes befoie the Court for an evidentiary hearing. 
The plaintiff, Inez Allred# is present with counsel, Michael 
Carlston and Cory Memmott. Richard Allred and Mary Lee Allred are 
present as defendants, pro se. 
COUNT; 8:41 
Richard Allred addresses the Court. 
COUNT: 8:46 
Michael Carlston makes his opening statement representing to the 
Court that there is no need for an accounting to the Court, 
COUNT: 9:00 
Richard Allred declines to respond to the opening statement. 
COUNT: 9:01 
Mr Carlston responds. 
COUNT: 9:04 
Richard Allred responds requesting that an accounting be made. 
Page 1 8943 
Case No: 010400765 
Date: ' Sep 22, 2004 
Mr Allred responds. 
COUNT: 11:49 
Mrs Allred responds requesting clarification. 
COUNT: 11:50 
Mr Carlston responds. 
The Court finds that based on evidence, the statute of limitations 
does apply. Mr Carlston will prepare the order from today's 
hearing. 
Mr Allred questions the amount. He submits his motion to the 
Court. Mr Carlston will respond in writing if he wishes by 
10/16/04. Mr Allred will then have until 10/20/04 to respond. 
COUNT: 11:55 
Court is adjourned and ail are excused. 
Page 3 (last) 


























ULLU 'I T 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO DEPARTMENT*A^ 
rpPeputy UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH'" 
INEZ H. ALLRED, et al, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 





Judge Gary D. Stott 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on September 22, 2004. 
WHEREUPON, the parties represented through by counsel, 
the following proceedings were held: 
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
(Electronically Recorded Record) 
ORIGINAL 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR - L I C . 2 2 - 1 0 2 8 1 1 - 7 8 0 1 ^ I f i f l 
SALEM, UT 8 4 6 5 3 &LVZ\ 



























Further, I find that the evidence establishes that 
Richard, excuse me, that David and Inez Allred controlled the 
rents as they wish. 
As for the tax returns, the exhibits of which have 
been received in this case, they claimed them as their 
individual income, they wrote them off as depreciated with 
respect to property interest. Richard Allred was the 
preparer of the documents for the exhibits that have been 
received, introduced here. He knew during the time of 
preparation of the claim to the monies, that is the rents 
that were being paid for the Provo property that, that those 
monies, those rents, the depreciations all were being claimed 
by David and Inez Allred individually, not by any trust, not 
by any trustee, not by any other individual other than those 
two persons. 
Therefore, based upon the evidence presented the 
court finds that the statute does apply. 
And you prepare the document appropriately for the 
ruling, Mr. Carlston. 
MR. ALLRED: Your Honor, may I make one more 
inquiry of the court? 
THE JUDGE: Sure. 
MR. ALLRED: My assumption is then that the amount 
that's owing to the trust is the amount that they originally 




























THE JUDGE: Whatever it... That's approximately 
that figure. 
MR. ALLRED: Okay. Now, may I request the court 
at this particular time I've prepared a motion. I believe 
that this amount is suitable for the application of 
prejudgment interest. It's a sum certain, it's easily 
calculable, it's a liquidated amount. And I think I like to 
make a motion at this point that have that included in the 
judgment with prejudgment interest. 
MR. CARLSTON: I'd like to consider that and 
respond, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: You nvay respond to it. You may 
respond to it in writing. 
MR. CARLSTON: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: And Mr. Allred... 
Let me do this so we don't have any questions. 
Tell me when you believe you can make the response. I'll 
give you the time you need. 
MR. CARLSTON: I'll be out of town next week, 
Your Honor, because I have— 
THE JUDGE: October 16th? 
MR. CARLSTON: That would be fine. Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Allred, you have to October 29th. 
MR. ALLRED: For what purpose, Your Honor? 
THE JUDGE: To respond to, to respond for 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
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Mr. Carlston's response to your request if you want to do so. 
MR. ALLRED: Okay. Let me, may I provide both the 
court and (short inaudible, no mic). 
THE JUDGE: You can give it to him. If there's, 
I don't know what your giving me but assuming this goes to 
the request you just made— 
MR. ALLRED: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: — if there's additional written 
response you have until the 29th. 
MR. ALLRED: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Anything else, folks? 
MR. CARLSTON: Your Honor, yes. One other 
housekeeping matter. The court has, may have a suggestion 
for this having probably encountered this a number of times, 
but when you have a case that's sort of sectioned on like 
this it's sometimes difficult to, to make sure that 
everything is resolved. 
THE JUDGE: I don't think there's anything 
outstanding now. 
MR. CARLSTON: Well, specifically they have not 
prepared an order on your July 26th ruling regarding adverse 
possession. And I'd be pleased to take a hand at that at the 
same time I do the other and submit it and work it out just 
so that it's all bundled up and— 




























he submits that to you? 
MR. ALLRED: No. We, no one as I recall was ever 
requested to write an order and therefore it wasn't done 
so. . . 
THE JUDGE: Why don't, why don't you do so and 
submit it— 
MR. ALLRED: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: — that along with the order you're 
going to prepare for today. 
MR. CARLSTON: Sure. 
THE JUDGE: Would you please, Mr. Carlston? 
MR. CARLSTON: Sure. 
THE JUDGE: All right. Thank you very much, 
folks, and you're all escused. 
MR. ALLRED: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: You're welcome. 





MEMORANDUM TO OUR EXECUTRIX, MARY ALLRED JENSEN 
Our contract with U. 5. West Communications, covering the property at 
425 East 1325 South, Provo, Utah County, Utah, 1$ somewhat complicated* since 
there are two distinct but correlated contracts covering the same property. 
Our original contract with the Telephone Company was for ten years, with 
options to rene^i for additional 10 year periods. 
Finance to purchase the ground and construct the first building was ob-
tained from Lincoln National Life Company, The monthly lease with the 
Telephone Company was sufficient to pay off Lincoln National Life in the ten 
year period and paid us $300 per month in addition* 
The original lease ran from March 1st of 1974 to March 1st of 1384, at 
which time Lincoln National Life was paid off in full. 
Before the contract had expired, the Telephone Company requested that . 
the building be enlarged* The Telephone Company entered into a second contract 
for a period of ten years and four months, and also extended the original con-
tract for a ten year period. 
A loan was obtained from the Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Coa$any, suf-
ficient to pay off the loan in ten years and give us a return of $300 per 
month which the Telephone Company has been directed to send such monthly pay-
ment to the Genealogical Foundation Account # 21-31416-2, Oavid H. Allred, 
Ine2 H« Allred, with Stephen James Allred as Trustee. This account will con-
tinue to receive the $300 monthly payment as long n^ the Telephone Company 
extends its contract. 
The $296,69 monthly payment on the second contract goes to Tracy Collins 
Genealogical Foundation Account # 0052179-9, David H. Allred, Inez H. Allred, 
together with Richard S- Allred, Trustee on the account. At our death, the 
account becomes Richard's* The Telephone Company has bBM instructed to 
divide the returns of the contract and any additional option exercised to 
each of the above accounts. Since Richard has not been working and had no 
money to pay off Mrs- Greaves, whose mortgage I assumed on the MBM Street 
Home, and which Richard took over to pay off, has been receiving this amount. 
Mother and I will control the disposition of the funds accumulating in 
these two accounts during our life time. 
This memorandum must be read in cooperation with Oarlene Nelson's letter 
to me dated February 4, 1987, and the two contract summaries attached thereto* 
The original contracts together with correspondence {a foot thick} are in my desk. 
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ADDENDUM I 
LAW OFFICES 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L CORPORATION 
I O EXCHANGE PLACE, ELEVENTH FLOOR 
POST OFFICE BOX 4SOOO 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH BA I - 4 5 - 5 0 0 0 
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 1 - 9 0 0 0 
FACSIMILE ( 8 0 I ) 3 6 3 - 0 4 0 0 
KENNETH L. R E I C H 
WRITER'S DIRECT NUMBER 
( S O I ) 3 2 2 - 9 I 3 0 
November 19, 2004 
Richard G. Allred 
1660 West Broadway, Suite 302 
Anaheim, California 92802 
Richard G. Allred 
Mary Lee Allred 
1527 Vineyard Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010-1333 
Cory Memmott 
Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell 
136 East South Temple, Suite 1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Allred v. Allred 
Dear Richard and Cory: 
Enclosed please find originals of the following documents: 1) Order Re: January 23,2004 
Hearing; 2) Order Re: June 18, 2004 Hearing; 3) Order Re: July 26, 2004 Hearing; and 4) 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Re: September 22, 2004 Hearing. Please review each 
of these orders and, if appropriate, approve the proposed Orders as to form. After approval, 
please return the original signature pages to me for filing with the Court. Thank you for your 
consideration of these items. 
Also, please note that Oscar McConkie is listed on the Certificate of Mailing for the 
Order RE: June 18, 2004 Hearing, and I have forwarded an original of this document to him for 
his review and approval. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
£ T 
Kenneth L. Reich 
KLR:PHS 
Enclosures 
cc: Oscar McConkie 
MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577) 
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. 
ALLRED, FINDINGS OF-FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: 
Plaintiffs, SEPTEMBER 22, 2004 HEARING 
vs. 
No.010400765 
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and 
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK Judge Gary D. Stott 
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT 
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE 
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST; 
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER 
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN 
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED 
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee 
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST, 
and QWEST CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
4. Plaintiffs acknowledged receiving $395,814.95 in rent in excess of amounts paid 
as mortgage on the property between 1983 and August 2000. Based upon the statute of 
limitations, the Court reduces this amount and renders judgment in favor of the Allred Trusts to 
$127,800.00, the amount of rents from the Provo Property retained by plaintiffs from March 
1998 to March 2001, the three years preceding the Allred Trusts claim for an accounting. 
5. The Court, therefore, awards judgment in favor of the Allred Trusts and against 
plaintiffs in the amount of $127,800.00. 
In conjunction with the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court further 
reviewed the motions by the parties and based upon the briefs submitted, the arguments made, 
and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
6. That Defendants' Motion in Limine Precluding Counter-Defendant From 
Claiming a Statute of Limitations Defense as to an Accounting and Restoration of Trust Funds is 
denied and the Court finds that defendants' counterclaim for an accounting is governed by the 
three-year statute of limitations found in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26; 
7. That Defendants' Motion in Limine to Prohibit the Introduction of Any Evidence 
of Any Payments to the Beneficiaries of the Trusts Without Sufficient Documentary Evidence, 
i.e. Receipts, Cancelled Checks, Etc. is moot by reason of the Court's preclusion at trial of any 
and all set-offs and disbursements against the Allred Trusts; 
8. That Defendants' Motion in Limine to Preclude Plaintiffs from Claiming Credit as 
a Distribution from the Trust Proceeds Any Checks that Were Issued to Defendants from 
Accounts Other than the Accounts to Which the Rent Proceeds Were Deposited is moot by 
-6-
DATED this day of , 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Gary D. Stott 
Fourth District Court 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Richard G. Allred 
Cory D. Mernmott 
-8-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
[PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: SEPTEMBER 
22,2004 HEARING was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this f\ day of November, 
2004, to the following counsel of record: 
Richard G. Allred 
1660 West Broadway, Suite 302 
Anaheim, California 92802 
Richard G. Allred 
Mary Lee Allred 
1527 Vineyard Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Cory Memmott 
Plant, Christensen & Kanell 
136 East South Temple #1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a conformed copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE: SEPTEMBER 22, 2004 HEARING was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this day of November, 2004, to the following 
counsel of record: 
Richard G. Allred 
1660 West Broadway, Suite 302 
Anaheim, California 92802 
Richard G. Allred 
Mary Lee Allred 
1527 Vineyard Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Cory Memmott 
Plant, Christensen & Kanell 
136 East South Temple #1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 




MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577) 
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
77V THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and 
through MARY A. JENSEN, Personal 
Representative for the ESTATE OF 
DAVID H. ALLRED, and INEZ H. 
ALLRED, 
Plaintiffs, 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR 
AMEND MEMORANDUM DECISION OR 
FOR NEW TRIAL 
vs. 
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and 
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK 
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT 
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE 
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST; 
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER 
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN 
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED 
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee 
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST, 
and QWEST CORPORATION, 
No. 010400765 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs Inez H. Allred and Mary A. Jensen, Personal Representative for the Estate of 
David H. Allred ("Plaintiffs" or "plaintiffs"), submit the following memorandum of points and 
authorities in support of its motion under Rules 52(b) and/or 59(a)(6) and/or 59(e), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure to amend the Court's findings in its January 11, 2005 Memorandum Decision or 
for new trial. This motion is supported by a memorandum of points and authorities filed 
herewith. 
FACTS 
1. On December 17, 2004, the Court held a proceeding at which the Court received 
evidence and argument concerning the defendants' "Motion for Award of Prejudgment Interest 
on the Rents from the Provo Property Wrongly Withheld from the Trusts." 
2. The Court took the matter under advisement and on January 11, 2005 filed its 
Memorandum Decision in the regard. See Exhibit A attached hereto. 
3. The Memorandum Decision states as follows: "The Court finds and the parties 
stipulated that $127,800 was owed to the trust for March 1998 through August 2000." See 
Exhibit A at p. 3. 
4. At no time have plaintiffs stipulated that they owed defendants any amounts. At 
the hearing held September 22, 2004, the following exchange took place: 
Judge Stott: Well, if there's a stipulation to it as to the 
calculations and the amounts then there isn't any 
need for testimony. 
Mr. Allred: Well, we, that's... I think that that's true. And our 
figures in this regard also match the figures of some 
documents that the plaintiffs had prepared. So I 
-2-
think that we, we are at that point in agreement. 
Plaintiffs I suspect are going to claim that they have 
various setoffs, but I suspect as well that that 
probably should be something that they should 
present rather than me. 
Judge Stott: It is. Let me inquire of Mr. Carlston and Mr. 
Memmott. Is there a stipulation, is there a 
stipulation agreement concerning the document that 
he's just given me? 
Mr. Carlston: Your Honor, there is a stipulation regarding, or an 
acknowledgment regarding the numbers. We 
haven't double-checked the calculations and we're 
not stipulating. But we did meet and did agree that 
the rents from 1983 through August of 2000 when 
the depositing of the, of the rents was taken away 
from Mrs. Allred was $703,688.64. -We also agree 
after a lot of effort that during that same period of 
time $307,853.69 was paid on mortgages and that 
by the process of subtraction the amount remaining 
is $395,814.95. We, of course, would like to 
address the statute of limitations questions and, and 
the waiver questions later. By acknowledging these 
amounts I don't wish the court to confer that we're 
waiving any of the other claims or defenses here. 
Judge Stott: No. I didn't, I didn't perceive it in that fashion. 
See Evidentiary Hearing Transcript attached hereto as Exhibit B in it entirety, at pp. 5-6. 
Following this exchange, counsel for plaintiffs argued at length as to plaintiffs' position that the 
agreed-upon "numbers" were of no importance because plaintiffs had no duty to account to the 
defendant trusts. Counsel asserted that "it's improper for there to even be an accounting required 
here because there is no duty, and there is no basis in the pleadings for the court to require an 
accounting." Id. at p. 12. The Court agreed that there is no basis for an accounting, yet ruled that 
the parties had stipulated that plaintiffs owed the defendant trusts certain amounts that would 









I'm going to, I'm going to allow you to put on 
testimony and evidence with respect to the 
application of the statute [of limitations]. 
Okay. 
With respect to concerning the question of setoffs, 
that's precluded. 
And would the court so that I'm clear, tell me, help 
me understand the reason that evidence on setoffs is 
precluded? 
Yes, I can. With your, with your argument and 
presentation here this morning and the information 
that both sides have discussed, and my finding that 
there is not a justification by the pleadings for the 
accounting, it is my perspective that with the 
agreement as to the figures that I've referred to 
earlier and those three sets, I do not need to address 
nor am I, nor am I required to do so the issue of 
setoffs. And where I have concluded that, that no 
further proceedings will take place concerning the 
question of accounting the only application that I 
have to hear that affects those numbers is that of the 
statute of limitations and not setoffs. 
And, and so even though they have not, they have 
not pled anything other than the accounting, and the 
court's ruled there's no basis for an accounting, the 
court's granting them a judgment on a cause of 
action that, that hasn't been pled. 
I have granted them, with the stipulation of all 
parties, the judgment that the trust is entitled to 
those three figures, that bottom line of $395,814.95. 
Okay. So the record is clear, Your Honor, the 
plaintiffs never stipulated to that. We stipulated 
that subject to our other claims and defenses those 
were the numbers. And I recognize the court has 
the authority to do what it's doing but I also have an 
obligation to make sure the record is clear that, that 
there was no stipulation of the sort the court has just 
characterized. 
Judge Stott: 111 hear you on the statute. 
Mr. Carlston: Call Mr. Allred. 
* * * 
Id. at pp. 29-30. 
ARGUMENT 
Under Rule 52(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a "court may amend its findings or 
make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly." Likewise, Rule 59(a) 
provides that the Court "may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional 
testimony, amend findings of fact anc conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, 
and direct the entry of a new judgment: [based on] (6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law." Although the Memorandum Decision is not a 
"judgment" according to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it is appropriate to consider that the 
Memorandum Decision subject to these rules because it appears to make "findings" and 
"conclusions" and is likely to be relied upon by the parties. 
On page three of its decision, the Court stated that the "Court finds and the parties 
stipulated that $127,800 was owed to the trust for March 1998 through August 2000." Contrary 
to the Court's finding, however, plaintiffs have never stipulated that they owed the defendant 
trusts any amount of money, for any time period, or on any basis. Plaintiffs, therefore, request 
that the Court issue an order amending its Memorandum Decision which can be clarified to 
reflect that plaintiffs have never stipulated to owing the defendant trusts any amount or, 
-5-
735, l 
alternatively, for a new trial on this issue. Plaintiffs' limited stipulation made to the Court on 
September 22,2004 was as to the difference between the amount of rents collected and the 
amounts paid on mortgages on the property from which rents were received. The record clearly 
establishes that plaintiffs maintained objection and defense to the duty to pay any amount. The 
transcript of the September 22, 2004 proceeding is transparent in this regard and plaintiffs 
respectfully request the Court's order amending its findings and conclusions found in the January 
11, 2005 Memorandum Decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs request that the Court alter or amend its findings to reflect that plaintiffs have 
never stipulated to owing the defendant trusts any amount at any time or, alternatively, for a new 
trial on this issue. 
DATED this 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
2fl day of January, 2005. 
Michael R.^Carlston 
Kenneth L. Reich 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this ^ day of January, 2005, to the following counsel 
ofrecord: 
Richard G. Allred 
1660 West Broadway, Suite 302 
Anaheim, California 92802 
Mary Lee Allred 
1527 Vineyard Drive 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Terry Plant 
Cory Memmott 
Plant, Wallace, Christensen & Kanell 
136 East South Temple #1700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
N:\20874\l\Pleadings\mem re amendment of decision l.wpd 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
A Uiah County, State of Utah 
[AiO^O (£/ Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and through 
MARY A. JENSEN, Personal Representative 
for the ESTATE OF DAVID H. ALLRED, and 
INEZ H. ALLRED, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and as 
Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK ALLRED 
TRUST; THE ROBERT MATTHEW ALLRED 
TRUST; THE MARY MICHELLE ALLRED 
TRUST; THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER 
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN JAMES 
ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN ALLRED 
TRUST; THE NATHAN ALLRED TRUST; 
THE MARY ALLRED TRUST; MARY LEE 
ALLRED, as Trustee for THE RICHARD G. 
ALLRED TRUST; and QWEST 
CORPORATION, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 010400765 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Request and Motion for the Award of 
Prejudgment Interest on the Rents from the Provo Property Wrongly Withheld from the Trusts. 
The Court has reviewed the file, the pertinent cases, listened to oral arguments on the matter and 
being fully advised, issues the following memorandum decision. 
7198 
BACKGROUND 
On September 22, 2004, Defendants filed a Request and Motion for the Award of 
Prejudgment Interest on the Rents from the Provo Property Wrongly Withheld from the Trusts, 
and Memorandum in Support Thereof. Defendants base their request on the Court's previous 
Order entitling them to rents and profits from the Trust's Provo Property since approximately 
January 1983. Defendants claim the amounts of rent, various mortgages and other payments 
subtracted therefrom are known commodities. 
On September 29, 2004, Defendants submitted an Addendum to the September 22 
Motion. Defendants cited and agreed with Plaintiff Inez Alfred's Trial Brief Regarding 
Accounting dated September 21,2004, which stated that the "Amount of Rents Less Some 
Expenses from 1983 to 8/2000 has been agreed upon by the parties...the total amount from March 
1998 to August 2000 is $127,800.00." 
In response, on October 18, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Request and Motion for the Award of Prejudgment Interest. Plaintiffs claim that 
Defendants are not entitled to prejudgment interest, but if the Court should decide otherwise, 
Defendants should only be awarded from the time they requested the return of rents in their 
Counterclaim of 2001. 
On October 28, 2004, Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' 
Opposition to Defendants' Request and Motion for the Award of Prejudgment Interest. 
Defendants reassert Plaintiffs admission to the Court of the rent amounts received less any 
mortgage payments from March 1998 through August 2000. Additionally, Defendants rely on a 
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document from Zions First National Bank providing records of Lease Deposits on the Provo 
Property from September 1988 through August 2000. On December, 17, 2004, the Court held a 
hearing on the issue of prejudgment interest. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
I. Prejudgment Interest 
Defendants provide a litany of case law establishing that "Utah courts award prejudgment 
interest in cases where * damages are complete5 and can be measured by 'fixed rules of evidence 
and known standards of value.5" Smith v. Fairfax Realty, Inc., 82 P.3d 1064 (Utah 2003). 
Defendants claim that the amount of rents is easily calculable in this case based on the stipulated 
amount from March 1998 through August 2000 and the Zions First National Bank document. 
However, Plaintiffs claim that a dispute remains as to the amounts of set-offs and credits 
from 1983 through August 2000. Although the rents are easily calculable from September 1988 
through August 2000, Defendants are requesting prejudgment interest on the amount owed to the 
trust, not simply rent amounts, for that time period. Calculating the monthly rent amounts does 
not establish the monthly amounts owed to the trust. Rent is a known standard of value, but the 
damages from 1983 through August 2000 are not complete since set-offs and credits can remain 
in dispute. 
The only damages that are complete and can be measured by "fixed rules of evidence and 
known standards of value" are from March 1998 through August 2000. The Court finds and the 
parties stipulated that $127,800 was owed to the trust for March 1998 through August 2000. 
Ruling Page 3 
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II. Time Frame 
Plaintiffs rely on the Utah Supreme Court decision, Stoker v. Huntington Cleveland 
Irrigation Co,, 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983), which provided that the plaintiff was entitled to 
prejudgment interest only from the time plaintiff demanded the return of surplus payments. 
Plaintiffs claim that if Defendants are awarded prejudgment interest, it should only begin to accrue 
from the date when Defendants first demanded payment to the trust; Defendants first demanded 
payment in their 2001 Counterclaim. 
Defendants argue that Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. The Utah Division of State Lands and 
Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1996) overrules Staker. In Trail Mountain Coal Co., the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
The general rule is that 'where the damage is complete and the amount of loss is fixed 
as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures, interest 
should be allowed from that time. . . ' In Consolidation Coal, we followed Bjork, 
holding that prejudgment interst on Consol's overdue royalties accrued from the date 
the payments were due . . . [BJecause Staker presented a relatively unique fact 
situation involving a refund of overpaid amounts, we hold that Consolidation Coal 
controls rather than Staker. Id. at 1371. (Citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court does not overrule Staker, but distinguished it from the general 
rule as a unique situation. According to the general rule followed by Utah courts, prejudgment 
interest should be allowed from the particular time where damage is complete and the loss is fixed 
as of that time. 
In this case, from March 1998 through August 2000, damages were fixed and complete at 
$127,800. Therefore, in following the general rule set forth in Trail Mountain Coal Co., this 
Court orders prejudgment interest to be paid to Defendants beginning from August 2000 on the 
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amount of $127,800. 
DATED this / / day of January, 2005. 
V-rio 'f4i
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ADDENDUM K 
4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
INEZ H. ALLRED Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Case No: 010400765 DC 
Judge: ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD 




Plaintiff's Attorney(s): CORY D MEMMOTT 
MICHAEL R CARLSTON 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD G ALLRED 
Other Parties: MARY ALLRED 
Audio 
Tape Number: AWS 2 6-401 Tape Count: 12:04-12:54 
HEARING 
This matter comes before the Court for a hearing. The Courts 
intent is to rule on matters raised at trial on July 20, 2005. The 
first matter addressed is the claim for off set that Ms. Allred has 
submitted as exhibit A-12. 
Upon review the Court does not accept her conclusions and denies 
such claim for the set off covered by checks or amounts without 
checks. 
As to the Federal and State taxes and the tithing that was 
overpaid or the contributions, the Court denies any offsets or set 
offs in this matter. The defense of waiver is addressed cis well as 
the Quit Claim. 
The Court finds affirmative defenses raised by Inez Allred and not 
considered previously by Judge Stott, carry today in this case, and 
thus concludes that trusts are not entitled to an actual judgment 
against Inez Allred. 
The Court will not accept any of the other defenses that have been 
raised. The Court concludes that the waiver and estoppel are 
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defenses which are valid. Counsel is to prepare the Findings from 
today's hearing and the hearing before Judge Stott. 
COUNT: 12:19 
Mr. Memmott addresses the court regarding issues from the letter 
dated April 2 0th. 
COUNT: 12:20 
Mr. Allred addresses as to the order from April 2nd. 
COUNT: 12:23 
Mr. Memmott is to prepare an amended order from the April 11th 
hearing. 
COUNT: 12:35 
Mr. Memmott addresses as to the order from the July 2 6th hearing, 
exhibit F. Discussion ensues. 
COUNT: 12:38 
Mr. Allred addresses. 
COUNT: 12:41 
Mr. Memmott addresses. 
COUNT: 12:42 
Counsel is to prepare a correct order from the proposed orders 
addressed. Discussion ensues. The Court amends the order by 
interlineation in open court. Counsel is to prepare a new order 
and have Mr. Allred review prior to submitting for signature. 
COUNT: 12:52 
Mr. Carlston addresses the court as to the Davis County matter. 
The Court states that the case was to be sent here and has not been 
received yet. Court is adjourned for the day. 
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
INEZ H. ALLRED Et al, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QWEST CORPORATION Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
5 DAY JURY TRIAL DAY 1 
Case No: 010400765 DC 
Judge: GARY D STOTT 
Date: July 26, 2004 
Clerk: keris 
Reporter: LIVINGSTON, ANNI 
ANNIL 
PRESENT 
Defendant(s): TRUSTEE FOR RICHARD ALLRED MARY LEE 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s}: MICHAEL R. CARLSTON 
CORY D MEMMOTT 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD G ALLRED 
PETER STIRBA 
TRIAL 
Off the record. The jury panel is sworn and fills out the 
questionnaire. They are excused until the following morning. 
COUNT: 9:50 
On the record. All parties are present and ready to proceed. The 
Court informs counsel of the jury panel's status. The Court 
discusses with counsel the motions in limine filed, the cut off 
date set in April, and any settlement efforts. Counsel in 
response. The Court will hear the motions in limine. 
COUNT: 10:01 
Mr. Carlston argues the motion to strike the documents of Mr. 
Allred and Mr. Stirba. This motion touches on the motion in limine 
re: taxes, motion in limine re: statute, and motion in limine re: 
tax returns. Mr. Memmott, Mr. Allred, and Mr. Stirba in 
response. Mr. Stirba indicates that the motion in limine re: 
video has been resolved. 
The Court indicates that Mr. Stirba may participate as far the 
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adverse possession claim is concerned, as may Ms. Allred.„ Mr. 
Meipmott will not participate in the adverse possession portion of 
the case. 
Mr. Stirba addresses the Court regarding the defamation claim and 
how it involves him. Regarding the other two claims Mr. Allred 
should be able to represent himself. Counsel in response. The 
Court indicates it will make a decision tomorrow. 
COUNT: 10:48 
The motion in limine regarding demonstrative aids is argued by 
counsel. The Court indicates the exhibit may be electronically 
enlarged or highlighted. Mr. Allred raises his objection to audio 
tapes or dramatizations. The Court indicates on the video 
depositions that the video will not used, only the transcript. If 
the witness is not present, then the video may be used. The Court 
al'so indicates that documents may be used in counsel's opening 
statements, if agreed upon prior to usage. 
COUNT: 10:56 
The motion in limine regarding the accounting counterclaims is 
addressed. The Court indicates that it will be the procedure. 
Proper procedure will be followed. 
COUNT: 11:01 
The motion in limine regarding limitations on the witnesses 
submitting evidence regarding a secret agreement is addressed by 
counsel. The Court indicates this matter has already been ruled 
on. 
COUNT: '11:02 
The motion in limine precluding the defendants addressing the 
transfer of the new owner is addressed by counsel. The Court rules 
that its previous finding will remain -- the preclusion will exist. 
If the the defendant opens the door regarding this issue 
then the plaintiff may pursue it. 
COUNT: 11:13 
The motion in limine on the claim for adverse possession is 
addressed by counsel. The Court grants the motion, finding it is 
well-taken. The adverse possession claim is denied. The Court 
clarifies that the motion in limine is granted -- this does not 
mean any kind of motion for summary judgment has been granted. 
COUNT: 12:16 
Based on the Court's ruling on the motion in limine regarding 
adverse possession, Mr. Stirba withdraws his other motions in 
limine. 
COUNT: 12:17 
Mr. Memmott addresses the Court regarding Judge Schofield's ruling 
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on the counterclaim of defamation. Counsel in response. The Court 
indicates that the defamation claim and Inez Allred's defenses to 
that will be presented to the jury. The jury will 
choose what they feel is believable. 
COUNT: 12:24 
Counsel address the Court regarding the statute of limitations. 
Mr. *Stirba is excused from further involvment in the case. The 
Court indicates that the letters will not be recieved, including 
any testimony referring to the letters. 
' COUNT: 12:36 
Mr. Memmott addresses the Court regarding Richard Allred's 
testimony as a witness. The Court will handle each objection as it 
may or may not come up. Mr. Memmott is encourage to make those 
objections. The Court is in recess. 
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And the dilemma that they have is that, after the 
quitclaim deed was signed and after this fiction takes place 
that now it's their tenant, then David and Inez renewed the 
lease in their own name in 1984. And then they made other 
modifications to the lease in 1987. Then they made further 
modifications to the lease in 1994. Then they made further 
modifications to the lease in 1998. 
Now, I do not believe that, even on a contractual 
basis, the successors and assigns language would track all of 
that. But, regardless if it did, the point still is that -
the question is, can you possess adversely through a tenant? 
The law is uniform, from all the jurisdictions where we've 
been able to locate authority, that you can. And then the 
question is, how do you determine whose tenant someone is? 
And then you look at the conduct. The conduct is the issue in 
adverse possession. We possess through the tenant. 
As a matter of fact, I think, with the third 
amendment to the lease, with the part that Mr, Stirba didn't 
read on the third amendment, they don't challenge that Qwest 
entered into these agreements with David and Inez Allred. And 
I believe that, by doing that, there indeed will be a motion 
on our part relating to whether or not they've waived their 
claim to contest adverse possession. 
In terms of the other things Mr. Stirba suggested, I 
don't think that there's any reasonable basis under the facts 
for the Court to consider any kind of a diversion such as the 
one that he suggested. And, as a matter of fact, I suggest in 
my response on this - 1 think they've misstated the Pender 
case and they respectfully should withdraw their claim that it 
supports their position. 
MR. STIRBA: May 1 make three small points? 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. STIRBA: First, Judge, this concept of they 
signed this lease and they signed this lease and they signed 
this amendment and signed this amendment and they said, "We 
were the owners," well, remember the facts of this case are 
they never told Qwest what they did. Because, if they had 
told Qwest what they did, Qwest would have done precisely what 
Qwest did in 2000 when it first found out who the record title 
owner was. They would have said, "Sorry. We're not going to 
enter into any leases with you. We're going to enter into a 
lease with the trustees." 
The proof is in the pudding. They didn't know until 
2000. That's the point of that language that I read to the 
Court. And to suggest that somehow you can fail to disclose 
what you've done and then say, "Yeah, but they said we're the 
owner; yeah, but they said we're the owner." They didn't 
know. Once they knew, they said, "Sorry. We're not going to 
deal with these guys. We're going to deal with these guys." 



















Second point is, it gets back to this anomalous way 
this has been presented where you're trying to somehow regain 
title as opposed to quiet title. The whole point is, in '91, 
when David goes to Richard and says, "Hey, I want these things 
deeded back," and Richard said, "Sorry; I'm not going to do 
it; I've got a fiduciary responsibility," that's when you 
bring your lawsuit. The fact that they go and they sit on 
their hands, do nothing, absolutely nothing, until 2000 when 
there's a new lease with Qwest and the rents now go to the 
trustee - that's what precipitated this lawsuit. 
That's the problem. When you wait and you don't do 
anything, then you can't come into court when you no longer 
have an existing title and you have no longer any possession 
and say, "Well, now we want to quiet title." Sorry. You 
should have done that back in '91 when you knew there was a 
title dispute. And the fact that you waited — guess what? ~ 
means your claim is now dissipated. 
The final point I'd like to make, Judge, is relating 
to the concept of actual You know, the case law in Utah is 
very clear. The Royal Street [phonetic] case, land company 
case, doesn't talk about constructive. It doesn't talk about 
claiming through a tenant. It talks about being in actual --
that's the language of this case and all the case law -
possession. 
Judge, I have a law office, and I have a lease. And 
I'm here to tell you I'm in actual possession of that space 
with the rest of the people in my firm. My lessor is not in 
actual possession of that space. Does the lessor have some 
contractual permissive rights at some point for some purposes 
to enter into that space? Absolutely. But to equate that 
with actual possession I would submit is not well founded. 
Our supreme court says you must be in actual 
possession. I guess at some point they could change it and 
say actual possession means you can do it through a tenant. 
But actual possession doesn't mean you can have a tenant there 
and that's tantamount to actual possession. It isn't. It 
flat-out isn't. 
Those are my three arguments in response. 
THE COURT: The Court, in response to Defendant's 
motion in limine re Plaintiffs adverse possession through 
possession of a tenant dated July 16th, not filed with the 
Court until July 19th, however, having considered all of that 
information, having heard counsel's arguments today and their 
presentation, rules in favor of Defendant's motion and grants 
the motion based upon the information argued. I find that the 
motion is well taken. The claim for adverse possession made 
by Plaintiff is denied. 
MR. CARLSTON: So you're granting summary judgment? 
THE COURT: I'm granting the motion in limine. 
That's how it was filed, and that's how it was structured. 
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1 I That's the very reason I said file your things before the 16th 
2 of July. All of you. Some of you sat here saying, "We did it 
3 ail before the 16th." That wasn't even dated until the 16th. 
4 Number 2: Motion in limine re interpretation of 
5 trust agreements. 
6 MR. STIRBA: That's just a straightforward parole 
7 | evidence issue, Your Honor. We have these trust documents. 
8 THE COURT: I don't even know what we have to argue 
9 here today. 
10 MR. STIRBA: At this point, I guess we don't really 
11 h a v e -
12 MR. MEMMOTT: I guess, Your Honor, I still have some 
13 defense of counterclaim issues. I did file an opposition to 
14 that motion. 
15 MR. CARLSTON: Can I make one more inquiry, Your 
16 Honor? 
17 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
18 MR. CARLSTON: With respect to the motion not being 
19 filed on the 16th versus the 19th, I'm not sure I know what 
20 the Court was referring to. 
21 THE COURT: Other than I'm extremely dissatisfied 
22 with the failure of everybody to file what you were supposed 
23 to file when you were supposed to file it. Now counsel come 
24 into Court and say, "It's a motion for summary judgment, and 
25 it should have been filed a long time ago. Now it's not 
properly filed in terms of its designation and time." I'm 
just saying nobody's complied with anything here so I'm taking 
them as they're filed. It's filed as a motion in limine, and 
I'm ruling on it as a motion in limine. 
MR. CARLSTON: In effect, it's a motion for summary 
judgment. 
THE COURT: Weil, it sort of rings that way, doesn't 
it? But it's not structured in that fashion in terms of the 
motion here. 
MR. CARLSTON: I just wanted to make sure the record 
is clear. 
THE COURT: I've granted the motion in limine. The 
motion in limine precludes Plaintiff going forward with the 
claim of adverse possession. That's what it does. You're 
right, Mr. Carlston. 
MR. CARLSTON: Does the Court care to make any more 
observations on the basis for the ruling so I might understand 
this? 
THE COURT: I accept the defendant's position as 
argued and presented in the memorandum. I find there are no 
genuine issues with material fact or questions of law that 
would defeat the position of the defendants as taken on this 
motion. And, except for the proposition stated in argument 




















MR. CARLSTON: On all of the other points. 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. I will acknowledge with you 
that, on the Pender case, it offers some interesting reading 
in terms of interpretation. 
MR. STIRBA: Judge, in light of that, the other 
motions in limine I think are obviously not worth pursuing 
from the standpoint of me representing the trustee and 
defending the adverse possession claim. 
THE COURT: Does that mean you withdraw your motion 
in limine re: interpretation of trust agreements? 
MR. STIRBA: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: It's withdrawn. Do you withdraw the 
motion in limine re: time period? 
MR. STIRBA: Yes. 
THE COURT: It's withdrawn. 
Number 4, motion in limine with respect to gifts to 
Allreds? 
of title? 
MR. STIRBA: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. RICHARD ALLRED: Wait a minute. 
MR. STIRBA: We withdraw it. 
THE COURT: It is withdrawn. 
Number 5, motion in limine with respect to validity 
MR. STIRBA: I withdraw it. 
THE COURT: It's withdrawn. 
Number 6, motion in limine regarding Judge 
Schofield's ruling has already been argued. 
MR. STIRBA: Already been argued. Subsumed in our 
argument, Judge. 
THE COURT: Resolved based upon the ruling. 
Which takes us now to "Other," Plaintiffs' motion to 
strike motions in limine. 
MR. MEMMOTT: Your Honor, on No. 6, I had filed an 
opposition related to the counterclaim. 
THE COURT: I'll be happy to hear you on that. 
MR. MEMMOTT: Your Honor, in regards to the 
counterclaim, I think it's not properly allowed for the jury 
to view his statement that on the face of the documents the 
property is owned by the trusts and lease rents should be paid 
to the trust. In regards to the defamation counterclaim, the 
standard is, based on the facts available to Inez, once she 
made the statement, was that statement substantially true? 
The statement against Inez is that she claimed her son took 
her property; he switched the accounts. I believe I'm 
entitled to show where those rents were going to in August of 
2000, prior to August of 2000, to provide a basis for Inez's 
statement as to why she said what she said. 
For a finding to be found in regards to Judge 
Schofield's ruling or the trust documents or the lease, it 
would have to be found that Inez didnt have a belief or her 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and 
through MARY A. JENSEN, Personal 
Representative for the ESTATE OF 
DAVID H. ALLRED, and INEZ H. NOTICE OF ACTION 
ALLRED, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, PENDING 
v. 
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually 
and as Trustee for THE RICHARD 
MARK ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT 
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY 
MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST; THE MICHAEL 
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST; THE 
STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE Civil No. 010400765 
KAREN ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED Judge Gary D. Stott 
TRUST; MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee 
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST; 
and QWEST CORPORATION, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
RICHARD G. ALLRED and MARY LEE ALLRED, 
Counter-claimants, 
vs. 
DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and through 
MARY A. JENSEN, Personal representative for 
the Estate of DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. 
ALLRED, and DOES I through 100, inclusive, 
Counter-defendants. 
7957 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that there is an action pending in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, in which a Ruling has been rendered against 
David H. Allred, his estate, by and through his personal representative, Mary A. Jensen, and 
Inez H. Allred, which Ruling is in favor of the Defendants and Counter-claimants therein. 
The property, which may be used to satisfy a judgment, is located in Bountiful, Davis 
County, State of Utah, and is described as follows: 
Beginning South 100 feet along Relocated Section Line and East 1 
rod from East quarter corner of Section 20, Township 2 North, 
Range \ East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence East 200 feet; 
thence South 0 degrees 59' West 160 feet; thence West 200 feet; 
thence North 0 degrees 59' East 160 feet to point of beginning. 
Property address: 330 North 1300 East, Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Tax Serial No. 04-047-0021 
The abovementioned property is an asset of the aforementioned Plaintiffs and Counter-
defendants, and, any transfer, sale, conveyance, gift, or encumbrance, is subject to the 
aforementioned Ruling, rendered in the Fourth Judicial District Court, State of Utah, 
Case No. 010400765, and, therefore, any transfer, conveyance, gift or encumbrance may be 
considered by the Court to be a violation of the Universal Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act, and 
any parties considering any of the abovementioned actions are hereby put on notice. 
DATED this 28th day of December, 2004. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Davis ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before^me^n thifVday of December 2004. 
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Q. Was there a document that was prepared? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know where that document is? 
A. I do. 
Q. Have you provided it to the defense? 
A. I presume it has been provided. 
MR. CARLSTON: I don't know. 
MR. ALLRED: We have asked for it a number of times 
and don!t have it. Will you provide it within the next five 
days? 
MR. CARLSTON: I will look and see if we have 
provided it. 
MR. ALLRED: We have asked for it in — 
MR. CARLSTON: I will certainly respond to you 
within a week. Five days kind of mixes me up with the 
weekends, so a week is -- a week from today. 
Q. (BY MR. ALLRED) Do you remember who signed the 
document? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who would that have been? 
A. My mother, Inez Allred. 
Q. Was it done, to the best of your recollection, 
after the death of David Allred? 
A. I am not sure. The dates will tell us. 
Q. Good enough. Have you taken any actions on behalf 
30 
of the trust since the time you were made trustee? 
A. Meaning. 
Q. Have you signed any papers, filed any papers, 
any action at all — 
A. No. 
taken 
Q. — on behalf of the trust? You have signed nothing 
as actual trustee? 
A. Other than the .documents of substitution. 
Q. You have not filed any papers or documents on 
behalf of the trust? 
A. No. 
Q. Not purchased any property or transferred any 
property or anything of that nature? 
MR. CARLSTON: Something that started after the 
litigation occurred, what relevance do you think it is to 
embark on this line of questioning? I am trying not to 
object here today, but I am having a hard time 
understanding — 
MR. ALLRED: I appreciate that, but I am just 
trying to see what has been going on. 
MR. CARLSTON: I know that, but the issue is 
whether you have the right to know, and I am trying to 
understand the relevance. 
MR. ALLRED: As far as I know, none of the 
questions I asked involve any privileged transaction. I 
31 
IARV ALLRED JENSEN 
J1 Q. Following the death of tfatfd Alfred, he was no 
2 longer a trustee. Is that your understanding? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. What my question is: Have you been designated the 
5 actual trustee of this trust at any time subsequent to 1997? 
6 A. I am not sure I understand the question. 
7 Q. Have you acted - have you acted as a trustee of 
8 this trust since 1997? 
9 MR. CARLSTON: I object to the extent it calls for 
110 a legal conclusion. 
11 THE WITNESS: I don!t know what acting like a 
12 trustee should be. I guess I am one. 
13 Q. (BY MR. ALLRED) Or the successor trustee? 
14 A. Right. 
15 Q. Have you ever been appointed the actual trustee? 
16 A. You mean with somebody dubbing me with a sword or 
17 something? 
18 Q. Yes. 
19 A. I don't know exactly what that means. I only have 
20 a document like you have it. I assume I am the actual 
21 trustee. 
22 Q. What, then, is the status of Inez Alfred? 
23 A. She has been substituted. 
24 Q. When did that happen? 
25 A. Within the last two years. 
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5 A L L R E D Sheet (8) of (19) i 
1 of the trust since the time you were made trustee? I 
2 A. Meaning. 
3 Q. Have you signed any papers, filed any papers, taken 
4 any action at all -
5 A. No. 
6 Q. - on behalf of the trust? You have signed nothing 
7 as actual trustee? 
8 A. Other than the documents of substitution. 
9 Q. You have not filed any papers or documents on 
10 behalf of the trust? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Not purchased any property or transferred any 
13 property or anything of that nature? 
14 MR. CARLSTON: Something that started after the 
15 litigation occurred, what relevance do you think it is to 
16 embark on this line of questioning? I am trying not to 
17 object here today, but I am having a hard time 
18 understanding-
19 MR. ALLRED: I appreciate that, but I am just 
20 trying to see what has been going on. 
21 MR. CARLSTON: I know that, but the issue is 
22 whether you have the right to know, and I am trying to 
23 understand the relevance. 
24 MR. ALLRED: As far as I know, none of the 
25 questions I asked involve any privileged transaction. I 
31J 
1 think I have a right to know, and thaf s that. 
2 MR. CARLSTON: I said I will respond within a week, 
3 but I want to understand the relevance of your inquiry here 
4 because this is something that has developed since the 
5 litigation. And I am having trouble understanding why it is 
6 relevant and you would be entitled to it. We may produce it 
7 because of convenience but -
8 MR. ALLRED: You can produce it or not. I think it 
9 is very relevant, but I am not going to discuss why I think 
10 it is relevant. 
11 MR. CARLSTON: Well, you might be asked-to later. 
12 Q. (BY MR. ALLRED) Have you at any time personally 
13 discussed with the LDS Foundation the donation of the Provo 
14 property building to the Church? 
15 A. Absolutely not. 
16 Q. Have you met with Larry Jenson in regard t o -
17 A. I have not. 
18 Q. Have you talked with anyone in regard to the 
19 disposition of the Provo property, should you or the 
20 plaintiffs get it back? 
21 A. Let me be sure I understand. You want to know if I 
22 have talked with anybody about the disposition of the 
23 property should the plaintiffs prevail? 
24 Q. Sure. 
25 A. I am going to carry out my father's wishes and give 
32J 


























Q. Was there a document that was prepared? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know where that document is? 
A. I do. 
Q. Have you provided it to the defense? 
A. 1 presume it has been provided. 
MR. CARLSTON: 1 don't know. 
MR. ALLRED: We have asked for it a number of times 
and don't have it. Will-you provide it within the next five 
days? 
MR. CARLSTON: 1 will look and see if we have 
provided it. 
MR. ALLRED: We have asked for it in -
MR. CARLSTON: 1 will certainly respond to you 
within a week. Five days kind of mixes me up with the 
weekends, so a week is - a week from today. 
Q. (BY MR. ALLRED) Do you remember who signed the 
document? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Who would that have been? 
A. My mother, Inez Allred. 
Q. Was it done, to the best of your recollection, 
after the death of David Allred? 
A. lam not sure. The dates will tell us. 
Q. Good enough. Have you taken any actions on behalf 
30_|_ 
DEPOI 



























A. That's right. 
Q. So as regards paragraph number 19, you don't 
know if there were repeated assertions and overtures, right? 
A. I don't know what you talked about sometime 
in our library. 
Q. Okay. Now, at the top of the next page it 
says, he further represented that the transfer --
Mr. Carlston: Just a minute. She wasn't 
with you and I would like her to follow along. 
Mr. Allred: Okay. 
Mr. Carlston: There you go. Right there. 
Q. (By Mr. Allred) At the top of the next page, 
middle of the line, first sentence. Further represented 
that the transfer of the Provo property of the trust would 
reduce the income taxes paid by the plaintiffs. 
Were your taxes reduced? 
A. No. Nothing changed. 
Q. Okay. That the plaintiffs would remain 
entitled to the income from the Provo property. 
Do you have any documents or written papers 
that say that you will remain entitled to the income from 
the Provo property? 
A. Well, we did all the borrowing of the money 
and paying it back. I don't know who else's name should be 
there. We went without what we might do in traveling or 
144 
I I A. I did not. I was in the hospital. 
2 J Q. Did you ever, in connection with Exhibit 30, 
3 I did you ever appear before a notary public and sign or 
4 J swear that you had signed Exhibit 30? 
5 A. No. 
6 J Q. In connection with Exhibit 31, did you ever 
7 I appear before a notary public and ever sign or swear 
8 I that you had signed the document which is Exhibit 31? 
9 1 A. No. Because it is dated the 3rd and the 
10 notary is dated the 3rd of February. A month later. 
11 J Q. I realize that, and that wasnft my question. 
12 I My question was did you ever appear before a notary 
13 J public — 
14 A. No. 
15 J Q. — either when you signed it or later, and 
16 swear that you had signed this document? 
17 A. No. 
18 I Q. Do you know the notary public whose name 
19 I appears on Exhibit 30? 
20 A. I do not know. 
21 I Q. Did Richard provide you with any further 
22 I advice as to the manner in which signing these deeds 
23 J would reduce your taxes and that of your husband, David? 
24 I A. He never discussed it with me. 






1 A. It would have to be later because that was 
2 I the day he presented it to us. 
3 Q. Well/ did he present it to you on December 
4 30, 1982? 
5 J A. According to my husband's signature. 
6 Q. But Ifm talking about when it was presented 
7 to you, not presented to your husband. 
8 1 A, It wasn't presented to me because I wasn't 
9 J there on the 30th. , 
10 I Q. All right. So when did he present it to 
11 you? 
12 A. I was --
13 Q* Now, think about my question. Let's ask 
14 this question: When did Richard present this document, 
15 Exhibit 30, to you? 
16 A. My husband presented it. 
17 J Q. Okay. So your husband, David, presented it 
18 J to you? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And when was that? 
21 A. It would have to be after that date. I 
22 don't know when I signed it. 
23 I Q. Okay. Could you tell us what you remember 
24 about the circumstances associated with your signing of 
25 Exhibit 30? 
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Q. (By Mr. Allred) Go ahead. Finish up. 
A. And then you prepared all these trusts to 
nine people. 
Q. Was I there and asked you to sign those 
papers? Was I there when you personally signed them? 
Mr. Carlston: Excuse me. Which papers? 
Q. (By Mr. Allred) The trust deeds for the --
Ifm sorry. The quitclaim deeds to the property. 
A. You weren't there when I signed it because I 
was in the hospital. 
Q. Was I there when David signed it? 
A. I don't know. I guess you were. 
Q. You said --do you know or do you not know? 
A. I recognize his signature. I don't know when 
he signed it. 
Q. Do you know whether I was there or not? 
Mr. Carlston: She has already answered that. 
She said she didn't know. 
The Witness: You weren't there when I signed 
it. 
Q. (By Mr. Allred) All right. 
A. Because I was in the hospital. 
Q. Who was there when you signed it? 
A. I suppose when you picked the papers up maybe 
that's -- but if you weren't there, I must have --
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1 The Witness: You had them prepared for us to 
2 sign. 
3 Q. (By Mr. Allred) Who presented them to you to 
4 sign? Who --go ahead. Who presented them to you for your 
5 signature? 
6 A. You left them there for my signature. When I 
7 got out of the hospital I was supposed to sign it. I signed 
8 it for you because you wanted the --we wanted the — 
9 Mr. Carlston: Just a minute. Just a minute. 
10 Q. (By Mr. Allred) Go ahead, rattle on. 
11 A. We wanted the taxes reduced. That appealed 
12 to us. But they never were reduced. 
13 Q. You just said I wasn't there when you signed 
14 them when you got out of the hospital, is that correct? 
15 A. Well, you weren't in the hospital with me. 
16 Q. Okay. Were you -- was I there when you 
17 signed those papers? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. All right. 
2 0 A. Neither was your notary. 
21 Q. My notary? 
22 A. You had them notarized. 
23 Q. Do you have any personal knowledge that I had 
24 them notarized? 
2 5
 A. It says on there you had them notarized a 
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Mr. Allred: She supplied the information, 
counsel. She has already testified to that. 
Mr. Carlston: Please, please, please, just 
don't badger the witness. Ask your question. 
Mr. Allred: What I want to know, is that 
statement true or false. 
Mr. Carlston: Mrs. Allred, he wants to know 
if you were at the meeting that's referred to in paragraph 
29. 
The Witness: No. 
Q. (By Mr. Allred) Okay. Now, you talk in line 
number three about previous representation and assurances 
that he is willing to consider return of the Provo property. 
Would you briefly list those returns -- those 
representations and assurances and tell me if any of them 
were in writing? What written representations and 
assurances did you get from Richard Allred that he was going 
to return the property? 
A. You would always give the answer, I can't do 
it because of my fiduciaries. 
Q. So I gave the answer that I can't do it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that always? 
A. Always. 
Q. And I always refused to return it, is that 
216 
it. 
Mr. Carlston: Well, you are misstating it. 
Mr. Allred: Okay. Letfs go ahead. 
Q, Regarding the Provo property on a family 
basis. Is that sufficient for you? When did I ever 
encourage you to believe that a resolution could be reached 
regarding the Provo property? 
A. Because you -- you always said it wasn't your 
idea to have the property, it's your fiduciaries. You 
didn't know what to do with them. 
Q. Did I ever say that I would sign? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But we were dealing with our own son and we 
trusted him. 
Mr. Carlston: Counsel, I have to make a real 
quick phone call right at 5 o'clock. Is it really close to 
five? Can I have just two minutes? 
Mr. Allred: About five minutes to 5. 
Mr. Carlston: Could I just hurry and do 
this? 
Mr. Allred: Sure. 
Mr. Carlston: Just a two-minute break. 
(Recess taken.) 
Mr. Allred: While we are on the record there 
219 
the LDS Foundation. 
A. I know it. 
Q. Did they tell you in 1991 that you needed to 
have the property transferred back to you? 
A. Yes. They couldn't complete their plans. 
Q. Did they tell you at that time that you 
didn't have legal ownership of the property? 
A. We thought we did because you allowed us to 
take care of it for ten years. 
Q. Paragraph 25. Let's read the first sentence 
there. Can you follow along? 
Plaintiff investigated further the 1982 and 
1983 quitclaim deeds and eventually discovered for the first 
time that Richard Allred had established the Allred Trust in 
favor of himself, of his wife, et cetera. 
Was that discovery for the first time in 
December of 1991 when you met with the LDS Foundation 
people? 
A. Well, that's when we went into trouble, when 
we couldn't complete our plans. 
Q. I just need a time. When did you discover 
for the first time. 
A. Yes. 





























assistance to you and your husband other than tax 
returns? 
He did. 




A. He put in a sprinkling system. He helped us 
with our dishwasher installation. He would help us with 
our cars. 
Q. Did Richard provide other servi'ces that you 
believed were attorney services other than the tax 
returns? 
A. In conversation, like -when I had a car 
accident, he did what he could to call and find about 
it; if they were going to reimburse me for the injuries 
or for the damages. 
Q. Did you understand that he was acting as 
your attorney? 
A. Well, that's the reason I called him, 
because he was an attorney^ 
Q. All right. Did Richard provide any services 
that you thought were attorney services in connection 
with the Provo property? 
A. I can't remember of any services he provided 
for the Provo property. My husband, David, did those 




MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577) 
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. 
ALLRED, 
AFFIDAVIT OF INEZ H. ALLRED IN 
Plaintiffs, OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and 
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK 
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT 
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE No. 010400765 
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST; 
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN 
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED 
TRUST. MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee 
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST, 
and QWEST CORPORATION. 
Defendants. 
1973 through the present. A copy of the Lease with the subsequent addendum and amendments 
is provided in the appendix of documents accompanying my affidavit as Exhibit 1. 
8. With respect to the lease documents described in paragraphs 5-7 above, neither 
Richard G. Allred or any of the Trust Defendants had any role or involvement in the either the 
negotiation or execution of such documents. 
9. In December 1982, a Quit Claim Deed to part of the Provo Property was recorded 
in Utah County. In February 1983, a Quit Claim Deed was recorded in Utah County to the 
remainder of the Provo Property. A signature purporting to be mine appears on each of the 
deeds. I did not sign the December 1982 deed on December 30, 1982. I was in the hospital at 
this time. I never appeared before a notary public and acknowledged signing this deed. 
Likewise, I have never appeared before a notary public and acknowledged signing the 1983 deed. 
Neither deed was recorded in Provo by my husband, David H. Allred, or at his request. 
10. Under the terms of the Lease in Article VII, Covenants of the Owner, paragraph 
(2) at page 9 it provides in part: 
To pay punctually, as and when the same shall become due, 
any and all taxes, duties, assessments and governmental 
impositions, extraordinary as well as ordinary, as shall or ' 
may be levied or assessed upon, against or with respect to 
the demised premises or any portion thereof.... 
11. Under Article V, Rental, paragraph (2) required Qwest to then reimburse us for 
the taxes paid under Article VII paragraphs (1) and (2 )" . . . within thirty (30) days after receipt of 
invoices from Owner supported by receipts for the paid taxes and insurance premiums." 
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SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and 
through MARY A. JENSEN, Personal 
Representative for the ESTATE OF 




AFFIDAVIT OF INEZ H. ALLRED IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
vs. 
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and 
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK 
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT 
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE 
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST; 
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER 
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN 
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED 
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee 
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST, 
and QWEST CORPORATION, 
No. 010400765 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
Defendants. 
is provided as Exhibit 1 of the appendix of documents accompanying my affidavit. 
8. With respect to the lease documents described in paragraphs 5-7 above, neither 
Richard G. Allred or any of the Trust Defendants had any role or involvement in the either the 
negotiation or execution of such documents. 
in Utah Qatinty. In February 1983, a Quit Claim Deed was recorded in Utah County to the 
remainder of the Provo Property. A ^ ^jmmmmgggg to be mine appears on e\ch of the 
feeds. 2. I was in thq hospital at 
/ 
t^his time. I never appeared before a notary public and acknowledged signing t)tfs deed. 
Lm^wise, I have never appeared before a notary public and acknowledged signing the 1983 deed. ledgfed sijs 
K eSkxrSi Neither deed was recorde^lffTFSW^ David H. Allred, or at his request. 
10. Under the terms of the Lease in Article VII, Covenants of the Owner, paragraph 
(2) at page 9 it provides in part: 
To pay punctually, as and when the same shall become due, any 
and all taxes, duties, assessments and governmental impositions, 
extraordinary as well as ordinary, as shall or may be levied or 
assessed upon, against or with respect to the demised premises or 
any portion thereof 
11. Under Article V, Rental, paragraph (2) required Qwest to then reimburse us for 
the taxes paid under Article VII paragraphs (1) and (2)". . . within thirty (30) days after receipt 
of invoices from Owner supported by receipts for the paid taxes and insurance premiums." 
12. Pursuant to these lease provisions from the commencement of the lease in 1974 





27. In the Complaint filed by me and my husband, David H. Allred, there is factual 
misstatement that has been pointed out to me by the defendants. In my Complaint, it mistakenly 
states that my husband and I attended a family meeting held on November 27, 1998. This is 
incorrect. As I clarified at my deposition, David H. Allred and I were not present. 
28. At the hearing on December 17,2002, defendants produced a signature card for a 
bank account at USBank. I have reviewed the signature card and the original from which the 
copy was made. I made copies of the signature card and the older attached signature cards and '" £X\rla>vu2^ 
have attached them as Exhibit 15 to the Appendix. They are now designated as Bates Nos. 1714 \j/JJ^r-
through 1715. It is clear from these copies that the account was in the name of David H. Allred 
and Inez H. Allred when it was opened on October 12,1973. 
29. The signature card does not appear to be related to Tracy Collins Bank and Trust 
account numbers 0052179-9 or 0052178-1, but was an account formerly with Farmers State 
Bank as account number 191321405. The USBank account had been nothing more to me than a 
depository for my social security checks and was closed following the death of David H. Allred 
when those checks stopped coming. The account was known to me as my "grocery account/' 
FURTHER THE AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this J j ^ ^ d a y of March, 2003. 
SLOAJUOMUJL 
InezH. Allr(v 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me thissjT day of March, 2003. 
u/yi&tn—± 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: f x fS?^ . NOXAU7V"J_ 
1 »f flffilra lUal 10 E x c hanga P<- 11th Rr. 
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MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577) 
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. ALLRED, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and as 
Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK ALLRED 
TRUST; THE ROBERT MATTHEW 
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY MICHELLE 
ALLRED TRUST; THE MICHAEL 
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST; THE 
STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE 
KAREN ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED 
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee for 
THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST, and 
QWEST CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff Inez H. Alired responds to Defendants Richard G. Alired, the Alired Trusts, and 
Mary Lee Allred's First Set of Request for Admissions as follows: 
PLAINTIFF INEZ H. ALLRED'S 
RESPONSES TO THE FIRST SET OF 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS OF 
DEFENDANTS RICHARD G. 
ALLRED, THE ALLRED TRUSTS, 
AND MARY LEE ALLRED 
No. 010400765 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
bears the signature of and was signed by David H. Allred. (Refer to Plaintiffs Deposition 
Exhibit Number 45) 
RESPONSE: See Response to Request No. 20. 
REQUEST NO. 29: Admit that the Quit-Claim Deed dated December 30,1982, stamped 
number 32615 by the Utah County Clerk, was signed by Inez H. Allred. (Refer to Plaintiffs 
Deposition Exhibit Number 30). 
RESPONSE: Inez H. Allred objects to Request No. 29 on the basis that it assumes facts 
not in evidence that have not been admitted, specifically that Exhibit No. 30 represents a binding 
"Quit-Claim Deed" that was intended to legally and equitably, and for all intents and purposes, 
transfer property from plaintiffs to those persons and/or entities named therein, and that the 
stated date "December 30, 1982/' actually represents a date related to any signatures found 
thereon. These assertions are denied. Subject to and without waiving any objections, Inez H. 
Allred admits that the referenced Exhibit No. 30 appears to bear a signature and that the signature 
appears to be like that of Inez H. Allred. Inez H. Allred, based upon her best recollection and 
information, does not believe that she signed Exhibit No. 30. On December 30,1982, Inez H. 
Allred was in the hospital and was unavailable to sign any documents. Moreover, Inez H. Allred 
denies that she appeared in front of a notary and that the notary statement is accurate. She asserts 
that to the extent it may be shown that she did in fact sign Exhibit No. 30, her signature was 
obtained based upon Richard G. Allred's representations that the document was for tax purposes 
only and was not to indicate any intention to transfer title or any interest in the Provo Property 
from the plaintiffs to the named entity or person. 
-12-
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RESPONSE: Inez H. Allred objects to defendants' reference and reliance on Bates No. 
771 for the reasons set forth in her response to Request No. 46. Moreover, this Request is vague 
and ambiguous as to when "the telephone company had 'been instructed " Notwithstanding 
the above, Inez H. Allred acknowledges the quoted phrase "been instructed to divide the returns 
of the contract and any additional option exercised to each of the above accounts" is from Bates 
No. 771 and that the only accounts that appear to be referenced in Bates No. 771 are Account 21-
31418-2 and Account 0052179-9. It is not known whether Bates No. 771 is a complete 
document or is accurate. Indeed, Bates No. 771 refers to a letter from Darlene Nelson, assistant 
manager-real estate, for Mountain Bell, dated February 4,1987, to David H. Allred, that 
indicates that Bates No. 771 "must be read in cooperation with Darlene Nelson's letter to me 
dated February 4,1987 . . . . " The letter from Darlene Nelson, Bates Nos. 808-9, and Bates No. 
771 are not consistent in material ways. For example, Ms. Nelson's letter states that the funds 
"they will continue going to Tracy Collins Bank & Trust " In Bates No. 771, some of the 
funds purportedly were going to a Zions' Bank account. 
DATED this / / f j ( day of August, 2002. 
INEZ H. ALLRED 
In& H. Allred 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this / / ^ a y of August, 2002. 
MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577) 
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




ERRATA REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and 
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK 
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT 
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE 
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST; 
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER 
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN 
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED 
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee 
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST, 
and QWEST CORPORATION, 
No. 010400765 
Judge Anthony W. Schofield 
Defendants. 
Upon review of their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary 
Judgment, plaintiffs Inez H. Allred and David H. Allred ("Plaintiffs") submit the following errata 
corrections to their memorandum (corrections in bold): 
1. In plaintiffs' numbered paragraph four in Opposition to Defendants' Statement of 
Undisputed Facts, plaintiffs made statements regarding the signatures of plaintiffs on the nine 
trusts. Upon review, plaintiffs recognize that their opposition found in paragraph number four 
should be as follows: 
Plaintiffs oppose the facts set forth in paragraph 7 of Defendants' 
Statement of Undisputed Facts on the basis that Inez H. Allred testified 
that she never signed neither Quit Claim Deed in front of a Notary. 
See July 1,2002 deposition of Inez H. Allred at 98 (Exhibit 10, 
Appendix of documents in Opposition to Summary Judgment 
("Appendix")). Plaintiffs, on page 6 at Wf21-22 of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint, acknowledged that Inez H. Allred and David H. Allred 
signed the two Quit Claim Deeds. 
2. Upon review of paragraph six of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Statement 
of Undisputed Facts, Plaintiffs recognize that it should read as follows: 
Plaintiffs oppose the facts set forth in paragraph 14 of Defendants' 
Statement of Undisputed Facts on the basis that the cited testimony is 
unclear and confusing whether Richard G. Allred was present when 
David H. Allred allegedly signed the Quit Claim Deed. In a letter 
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In the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah rILiStf 
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DAVID H. ALLRED and 
INEZ H. ALLRED, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RICHARD G. ALLRED, 
individually and a Trustee 
for the RICHARD MARK ALLRED 
TRUST, et al., 
Defendants. 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
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Be it remembered that on the 1st day of July, 
2002, the deposition of Inez Allred, produced as a witness 
herein at the instance of the Allred defendants herein, in 
the above-entitled action now pending in the above-named 
court, was taken before Dawn M. Davis, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, 
commencing at the hour of 9:48 a.m. of said day at the 
office of Snow, Christensen and Martineau, 10 Exchange 
Place, Suite 1100, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
That said deposition was taken pursuant to 
Notice. 
--0O0--
Rocky Mountain Reporting Service, Inc. 
The Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Suite 528 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone (801) 531-0256 
E-Mail: rockymountainrep@qwest.net 
Statewide Reporting 
National and Merit Certified Reporters 
Expedited Delivery 
Computerized Transcription 
IBM Compatible Disks 
Litigation Support Software 
Video Depositions 
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The Witness: Okay. 
Q. (By Mr. Allred) That document you are 
looking at is the signature page purporting to the original 
copy of the Stephen James Allred Trust. Is that your 
signature affixed on that page? 
A. It looks like my signature, but I didn't 
place it there. 
Q. Okay. You have never seen that document 
before, is that right? 
A. No, I have never seen it. 
Q. Does it appear to be David H. Allredfs? 
A. Yes, it appears. 
Q. Does it appear to be notarized with a raised 
notary stamp and signed by a notary? 
A. The nptary -- see, I have never seen this. I 
don't -- I guess --
Q. I am not asking you if you saw it. I am just 
asking you if it appears it is notarized and if there is a 
raised, embossed --
A. Yes, it looks as if she has notarized the 
signature of a woman who was in the hospital. 
Mr. Allred: That's fine. 
Mr. Carlston: One matter before you leave 
this. Your question was -- you asked her if she had ever 
seen it before and I believe you mean in -- had ever seen it 
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Reporterf s Certificate 
State of Utah ) 
) 
County of Salt Lake) 
ss. 
I, Dawn M. Davis, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing proceedings were taken before me at 
the time and place set forth herein; that the witness was 
duly sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing 
but the truth; and that the proceedings were taken down by 
me in shorthand and thereafter transcribed into typewriting 
under my direction and supervision; 
That the foregoing pages contain a true and correct 
transcription of my said shorthand notes so taken. 
In witness whereof, I have subscribed my name and 
affixed my seal this /ffw^day of KA/lMW 2002. 
Notary Public 
My commission expires: 
April 15, 2004 
\.; * * * *y 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
DAWN M DAVIS 
1205 NORTH FAIRWAY 
FARMINGTON, UT 84025 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES 
APRIL 15TH 2004 
STATE Of UTAH 
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ADDENDUM Q 
RICHARD G. ALLRED (0059) 
1660 W. Broadway, Suite 302 
Anaheim, California 92802 
(714) 585-5559, (801) 295-6801 
Attorney for Richard Allred, 
Individually and as Trustee. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and 
through MARY A. JENSEN, Personal 
Representative for the ESTATE OF 
DAVID H. ALLRED, and INEZ H. ALLRED, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually 
and as Trustee for THE RICHARD 
MARK ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT 
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY 
MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST; THE MICHAEL 
CHRISTOPHER ALLRED TRUST; THE 
STEPHEN JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE 
KAREN ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED 
TRUST; MARY LEE ALLRED, as Trustee 
for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED TRUST; 
and QWEST CORPORATION, 
Defendants, 
I. DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR AN ORDER 
QUIETING TITLE 
II. DEFENDANTS'MOTION 
FOR THE REMOVAL OF 
LIS PENDENS 
III. DEFENDANTS'MOTION 
FOR A COURT 
DETERMINATION OF 
OWNERSHIP OF A 
"SLIVER" OF LAND 
IN CONJUNCTION WITH 
THE PROVO PROPERTY 
Civil No. 010400765 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
RICHARD G. ALLRED and MARY LEE ALLRED, 
Counter-claimants, 
vs. 
DAVID H. ALLRED, deceased, by and through 
MARY A. JENSEN, Personal representative for 
the Estate of DAVID H. ALLRED and INEZ H. 
ALLRED, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, 
Counter-defendants. 
^Birs, assignees, trustees, personal representatives, etc., therefore removing the cloud of title 
found upon the Provo Property, at the present time. 
As the Court is aware, this Court has, on numerous occasions, spoken from the bench as 
well as by written order, stating that the Provo Property is owned by the Allred Trusts and has 
been so for many years. 
Likewise, the Allred Trusts are entitled to the income therefrom. Although these 
statements effectively, for all intents and purposes, establish Quiet Title in the name of the Allred 
Trusts, it would be well, for filing with the Utah County Recorder, to have an Order Quieting 
Title. 
Thus, Petitioners request said Order Quieting Title be issued by the Court. 
II. LIS PENDENS 
As the Court is aware, Section 78-40-2 of the Utah Code, allows the filing of a Lis 
Pendens. 
Section 78-40-2.5 states as follows: 
"...[2] Anytime, after a notice has been recorded, pursuant to Section 78-40-2 any 
of the following may make a motion to the court in which the action is pending to 
release the notice: (a) A party to the action; (b) A person with an interest in the 
property effected by the notice. 
[3] The court shall order a notice released if: (a) The court receives a motion to 
release under Subsection [2]; and (b) The court finds that the claimant has not 
established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real 
property claim that is the subject of the notice. 
[4] If the court releases a notice pursuant to this section, the claimant may not 
record another notice with respect to the same property without approval of the 
court in which the action is pending. 
[5] Upon a motion by any person with an interest in the real property that is the 
/ / ^ / 
subject of a notice, a court may require the claimant to give the moving party a 
guarantee as a condition of maintaining the notice: (a) Any time after a notice has 
been recorded; and (b) Regardless of whether the court has received an application 
to release under Subsection [2]. 
[6] A person who receives a guarantee under Subsection [5] may recover an 
amount not to exceed the amount of the guarantee upon a showing that: (a) The 
claimant did not prevail on the real property claim; and (b) The person seeking the 
guarantee suffered damages as a result of the maintenance of the notice. 
[7] A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party on any motion 
under this section unless the court finds that: (a) The non-prevailing party acted 
with substantial justification; or (b) Other circumstances make the imposition of 
attorney fees and costs unjust." 
Defendants herein, are at this time, making a motion for the removal of the Lis Pendens 
filed by the Plaintiffs, attached hereto, [Exhibit D], and are requesting that the Court order the Lis 
Pendens removed. The Court, has, on many occasions, stated that the Provo Property is owned 
by the Allred Trusts and that the Plaintiffs have not shown colorable claim to the property. 
Thus, a Lis Pendens is not justified, since Plaintiffs have shown no viable, potential claim 
to the property in any way. Or, in the alternative, Plaintiffs should be required to post a bond, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-40-2.5 as previously enunciated. 
III. DETERMINATION OF OWNERSHIP OF SLIVER OF LAND 
CONVEYED BY QUIT CLAIM DEED BY PROVO CITY IN 1974 
Some confusion has risen as to the disposition and ownership of a small, small sliver of 
land conveyed to David H. Allred and Inez H. Allred on April 16, 1974 by the City of Provo, 
Utah. It would appear that this sliver of land was directly adjacent to the newly constructed 
public road in front of the Provo Property. Indeed, the deed says on its face: 
"The intent of this deed is to convey to Mr. Allred a triangular shaped sliver 
of ground over which his fence line encroaches into 1325 South Street." 
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MICHAEL R. CARLSTON (A0577) 
KENNETH L. REICH (A8578) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 






RICHARD G. ALLRED, individually and 
as Trustee for THE RICHARD MARK Judge 
ALLRED TRUST; THE ROBERT 
MATTHEW ALLRED TRUST; THE 
MARY MICHELLE ALLRED TRUST; 
THE MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER 
ALLRED TRUST; THE STEPHEN 
JAMES ALLRED TRUST; THE KAREN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE NATHAN 
ALLRED TRUST; THE MARY ALLRED 
TRUST, MARY LEE ALLRED, as 
Trustee for THE RICHARD G. ALLRED 
TRUST, and QWEST CORPORATION, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that there is an action in the above-entitled court, the 
object and purpose of which is to quiet title to the real property located at 475 East 1325 South, 
Provo, Utah County, Utah, which is more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at a point on the north side of 1325 South Street, 
Provo, Utah, and the southeast corner of Commercial Tire 
Company's property, which point is south 289.5 feet and east 
1504.71 feet from the northwest corner of section 18, township 7 
south, range 3 east, Salt Lake base and meridian; then north 0°. 
15 minutes east 526.0 feet; then south 89° 10 minutes east 414.0 
feet; then south 0° 50 minutes west 526.0 feet; thence north 89° 
10 minutes west 414.0 feet to the place of beginning. 
DATED this / 5 ( i a y of February, 2001. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By/^£tS 
Michael R. Carlston 
Kenneth L. Reich 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
-t^ COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this \*Q day of February, 2001, 
by Kenneth L. Reich. 
N:\20874U\Lis pcndens.wid 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
JEAN T. LAYTON 
10 Exchange Race, 11th Fir 
Salt Lake City, Utah 64111 
My Commission Expires 
December 2, 2002 
STATE OF UTAH 
-2-
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